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Chapter 10 
 
Canada, the European Union and Regional Fisheries Management in the 
North Atlantic: Conflict, Cooperation and Challenges 
 
Erik Franckx∗, Koen Van den Bossche, and David L. VanderZwaag** 
 
 
10.1. Introduction 
 
Canada and the European Union (EU) cooperate in four regional fisheries 
management organisations (RFMOs) applicable to areas of the North Atlantic. 
They include the North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization (NASCO),1 
the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas 
(ICCAT),2 the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO),3 and the 
North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC).4 
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1
 Established by the Convention for the Conservation of Salmon in the North Atlantic Ocean, 
which entered into force on 10 October 1983, NASCO provides a forum for consultation and 
cooperation in the salmon stocks that migrate beyond areas of fisheries jurisdiction of coastal 
states of the Atlantic Ocean north of 36oN latitude. North Atlantic Salmon Conservation 
Organisation (NASCO), “About NASCO,” available: <http://www.nasco.int> (retrieved 
20 November 2008) [hereinafter NASCO].  
2
 The International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), responsible 
for the conservation of tunas and tuna-like species in the Atlantic Ocean and adjacent seas, was 
established by the International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, which 
entered into force in 1969. International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas 
(ICCAT), “Introduction” at <http://www.iccat.int/en/introuction.htm> (retrieved 20 November 
2008) [hereinafter ICCAT]. 
3
 NAFO, founded in 1979 as a successor to the International Commission of the Northwest 
Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF), has management responsibility for many fisheries resources of the 
Northwest Atlantic, except for salmon, tunas/marlins, whales and sedentary species. Northwest 
Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (NAFO), “About NAFO,” available <http://www.nafo.int/ 
about/frames/ about.html> (retrieved 20 November 2008). 
4
 NEAFC, established pursuant to the Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in North 
East Atlantic Fisheries which entered into force in November 1982, recommends measures to 
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This chapter focuses on the role of Canada and the EU in two of the 
RFMOs dealing with straddling fish stocks, NAFO and NEAFC, through 
a three-part format. The first section highlights the well-known conflict 
between the EU and Canada over the setting of quotas within NAFO for 
Greenland halibut. The famous Estai incident involved the arrest by Canada of 
a Spanish trawler in the NAFO Regulatory Area outside Canada’s 200 nautical 
mile (nm) fisheries zone. Spain’s subsequent litigation against the European 
Commission and Council for agreeing to a lowered total allowable catch (TAC) 
for Greenland halibut is also described. The second section addresses two main 
dimensions of cooperation. Global instruments and initiatives guiding regional 
cooperation in the North Atlantic are first described. The complexities of 
cooperation in relation to fisheries at the EU level are then discussed, including 
competences on the external level and the European Community’s (EC) role in 
regional fisheries organisations. The third section reviews four ongoing 
challenges in regional fisheries management: putting the precautionary 
approach into practice; implementing the ecosystem approach; reaching 
consensus on allocation criteria; and ensuring effective compliance and 
enforcement. The chapter concludes with some key questions raised for 
discussion at the Brussels Workshop on EU Canada Relations in Law of the Sea 
and Ocean Governance, 4–5 December 2008. 
 
 
10.2. Conflict 
 
10.2.1. The Estai Incident  
 
Canadian and European fisheries relations infamously came to the forefront of 
affairs during the Estai incident. The Spanish vessel, Estai, was arrested for 
fishing Greenland halibut (turbot) outside Canada’s 200 nm fisheries zone off 
Newfoundland in March 1995. The arrest might be described an act of 
exasperation because of the failure of NAFO to adequately regulate the 
harvesting of turbot and growing concern over the unsustainable fishing 
                                                                                                                                  
Contracting Parties for the rational exploitation of fish stocks in the Convention Area taking 
scientific advice from the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES). North 
East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC), “About NEAFC,” available: 
<http://www.neafc.org/about/neafc-faq.htm> (retrieved 20 November 2008) [hereinafter 
NEAFC].  
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practices of Spanish and Portuguese vessels in the NAFO Regulatory Area.5 
Canada had lost patience over the excessive use of the NAFO objection 
procedure as the EU sought to exceed NAFO recommended quotas, garnering 
some 48 EU objections between 1985 and 1991.6 With the accession of Spain 
and Portugal to the European Economic Community, the problem of Portuguese 
and Spanish overcapacity was exported to the waters off Canada7 as Spain’s 
distant-water fleets had not been given many fishing opportunities within the 
Community waters. At the same time, its fleets were evicted from third country 
waters following the worldwide emergence of 200 nm limits.8  
NAFO attempts to set Greenland halibut quotas for 1995 was the matter 
of contention. The NAFO’s Fisheries Commission had set a total allowable 
catch (TAC) of 27,000 tonnes with 60.37 percent allocated to Canada, 12.59 
percent to the EU and the remainder principally to Russia and Japan. The EU 
objected and established a unilateral quota of 69 percent of the TAC.9 The 
soaring Spanish catch of turbot from 13 tonnes in 1989 to over 40,000 tonnes in 
1994 was a matter of concern to Canada.10 The misreporting of fish catches in 
1993 and 1994 by both Spanish and Portuguese vessels and the apparent lack of 
effective sanctioning by Spanish and Portuguese authorities for the infractions 
                                                 
5
 For a general review and critique of NAFO, see T. Henriksen, G. Hønneland, and A. Sydnes, 
“The Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO)” in T. Henriksen, G. Hønneland, and 
A. Sydnes, eds, Law and Politics in Ocean Governance: The UN Fish Stocks Agreement and 
Regional Fisheries Management Regimes (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2006), pp. 63–97. NAFO 
was established pursuant to the 1978 Convention on Future Multilateral Co-operation in the 
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries. This convention was approved by the European Economic 
Community (EEC) by Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3179/78 of 28 December 
1978 Concerning the Conclusion by the European Economic Community of the Convention on 
Future Multilateral Co-operation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, Official Journal L 378 
(30 December 1978) 1. NAFO’s Regulatory Area is that part of the area of the NAFO 
Convention Area not falling under the sovereignty or within the jurisdiction of coastal states. 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 27/2005 of 22 December 2004 Fixing for 2005 the Fishing 
Opportunities and Associated Conditions for Certain Fish Stocks and Groups of Fish Stocks, 
Applicable in Community Waters and, for Community vessels, in Waters Where Catch 
Limitations are Required, Article 3 (d), Official Journal L 12 (14 January 2005) 1. 
The Northwest Atlantic Area is defined in Article 1 of the Convention. 
6
 Counter-Memorial of Canada (Jurisdiction) in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Spain v. 
Canada), The Hague, International Court of Justice (February 1996), p. 13 [hereinafter 
Counter-Memorial of Canada]. 
7
 D. Day, “Tending the Achilles’ Heel of NAFO: Canada Acts to Protect the Nose and Tail of 
the Grand Banks,” Marine Policy 19 (1995): 257–270, p. 265. 
8
 R. R. Churchill, “The EC and its Role in Some Issues of International Fisheries Law,” in 
E. Hey, ed., Developments in International Fisheries Law (The Hague, Boston: Kluwer Law 
International, 1999), p. 522.  
9
 Counter-Memorial of Canada, n. 6 above, pp. 19–20. 
10
 Id., p. 18. 
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heightened Canadian concern.11 
Canada readied itself for unilateral enforcement actions through both 
legislative and regulatory measures. On 12 May 1994 the Canadian Parliament 
adopted Bill C-2912 amending the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act.13 
The amendments recognised straddling stocks on the Grand Banks of 
Newfoundland as threatened with extinction and emphasised the urgent need 
for all fishing vessels to comply in both Canadian fisheries waters and the 
NAFO Regulatory area with sound conservation measures.14 Bill C-29 
prohibited persons onboard certain classes of vessels from fishing for stated 
straddling stocks in contravention of prescribed conservation measures. It also 
authorised regulations to be passed stipulating vessels and stocks subject to the 
legislation, as well as setting conservation measures.15 On 3 March 1995 
Canada amended the Coastal Fisheries Protection Regulations16 providing for 
enforcement action against Spanish and Portuguese vessels fishing for 
straddling stocks in the NAFO Regulatory area in contravention of prescribed 
conservation measures and included a prohibition on fishing for Greenland 
halibut. 
Canada subsequently initiated enforcement action of its newly-amended 
regulations. Canadian fisheries protection officers boarded and inspected the 
Estai on 9 March 1995. The ship was seized, and the master was arrested in 
violation of the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act and Regulations. The master 
was released on March 12th upon payment of CAD8,000 in bail, and the vessel 
was released on March 15th upon provision of a CAD500,000 bond.17 
Spain was unable to challenge Canada’s enforcement actions in the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ). In a case filed with the ICJ on 28 March 
1995, a majority of the Court, in a decision handed down on 4 December 1998, 
agreed with Canada’s position that the Court did not have jurisdiction to 
consider the merits of the case.18 Canada had deposited a new optional clause 
declaration with the ICJ on 10 May 1994 excluding from the Court’s 
jurisdiction disputes concerning Canadian conservation and management 
measures taken with respect to vessels fishing in the NAFO Regulatory Area 
                                                 
11
 Id. 
12
 Act to amend the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, S.C. 1994, c. 14. 
13
 Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-33. 
14
 Act to amend, n. 12 above, Section 5.1. 
15
 Id., Section 5.2. 
16
 Coastal Fisheries Protection Regulations (Amendment), SOR/95-136. 
17
 Counter-Memorial of Canada, n. 6 above, p. 21. 
18
 Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 
1998, p. 432. 
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and the enforcement of such measures.19 
In Jose Pereira E Hijos S.A. v. Canada (Attorney General),20 corporate 
owners and the captain of the Estai instituted a civil action before the Federal 
Court of Canada with the statement of claims being filed on 28 July 1995 and 
amended on 30 April 2003. Various damages were sought, including 
CAD150,000 in general damages for each plaintiff, with key allegations being 
that the arrest of the ship in international waters was illegal and that there was 
an unlawful trespass by servants/agents of the federal Crown. A central 
argument by the plaintiffs was that the arrest was unlawful because supporting 
Canadian regulations were not enacted for valid conservation and management 
measures agreed to by NAFO Contracting Parties.  
In a January 2007 decision, the Federal Court of Appeal reversed 
a damage award by the trial judge and denied all damage claims.21 The Court 
found that the Canadian Parliament’s intention was for Canada to take 
enforcement actions in the NAFO Regulatory Area regardless of whether or not 
Contracting Parties had reached agreement on conservation measures. The 
Court also indicated there was no demonstration that the Canadian government 
had acted in bad faith in enacting the regulations. 
In April 1995, Canada and the EU reached an agreement dousing the 
flames lit by the Estai incident.22 Canada agreed to repeal its regulatory 
targeting of Spanish and Portuguese vessels fishing in the NAFO Regulatory 
Area (effective 1 May 1995), and both parties agreed to jointly submit to the 
NAFO Fisheries Commission a submission to strengthen NAFO conservation 
and enforcement measures.23 Both parties also agreed to implement on 
a provisional basis various control and enforcement measures, including 
a commitment to ensure independent and qualified observers aboard all vessels 
fishing in the NAFO Regulatory Area.24 
                                                 
19
 Canadian Declaration of 10 May 1994, in Counter-Memorial of Canada, n. 6 above, Annex 2. 
20
 Jose Pereira E Hijos S.A. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2005 FC 1011, 17 C.E.L.R. (3d) 1. 
21
 2007 FCA 20, 26 C.E.L.R. (3d) 169. 
22
 See D. Freestone, “Canada and the EU Reach Agreement to Settle the Estai Dispute,” 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 10 (1995): 397–411. 
23
 Council Decision 95/586/EC of 22 December 1995 Concerning the Conclusion of the 
Agreement Constituted in the Form of an Agreed Minute, an Exchange of Letters, an Exchange 
of Notes and the Annexes Thereto Between the European Community and Canada on Fisheries 
in the Context of the NAFO Convention, Official Journal L 327 (30 December 1995) 35–45 
[hereinafter EC/Canada Agreement]. It was signed by the Commission pursuant to Council 
Decision 95/546/EC of 17 April 1995 on the Signature and Provisional Application of the 
Agreement Between the European Community and Canada on Fisheries in the Context of the 
NAFO Convention, Official Journal L 308 (21 December 1995) 79. 
24
 Counter-Memorial of Canada, n. 6 above, p. 81. For further reviews of the Estai incident, see 
T. L. McDorman, “Canada’s Aggressive Fisheries Actions: Will They Improve the Climate for 
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10.2.2. Consequences of the Estai Incident Observable at the EU Level 
 
Consequently, in September 1995, NAFO approved a formula for the allocation 
of Greenland halibut quotas. Accordingly, the EU fisheries Council established 
for 1995, an EC quota of approximately 19 percent of the NAFO TAC.25 This 
TAC was challenged before the European judicial institutions.  
In Case T-196/99,26 for example, Spain bought a claim to the European 
Court of First Instance (ECFI) seeking a declaration that the Commission and 
Council were liable under Article 288 of the EC Treaty27 for losses suffered by 
it following the adoption of the 1995 TAC for Greenland halibut. With respect 
to the alleged illegality of the Council’s action in adopting Regulation 
3366/94,28 Spain argued that by not lodging an objection, the Council neglected 
the objectives of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) set out in Article 33 
of the EC Treaty. The Council was accused of misusing its discretion because it 
refrained from objecting to the 1995 TAC for Greenland halibut on the basis of 
the objectives set out in Article 33 of the EC Treaty. Failure to oppose the TAC 
particularly compromised the objective of ensuring rational development of 
agricultural production and a fair standard of living for the agricultural 
community.29 The ECFI noted that the Council’s decision to accept the TAC 
and its acquiescence by implication concerned a measure for conserving marine 
                                                                                                                                  
International Agreements?” Canadian Foreign Policy 2 (1994): 5–28; J. A. Beesley and 
M. Rowe, “Sound Basis in International Law for Canada’s Actions in the ‘Turbot War’,” 
Canadian International Lawyer 1 (1995): 177–180; G. L. Lugten, “Fisheries War for the 
Halibut,” Environmental Policy and Law 25 (1995): 223–229; P. M. Saunders, “And Now That 
the War Is Over ... Looking Back at the Canada-European Union Fisheries Confrontation of 
1995,” The Canadian Law Newsletter 31 (1996): 15–37; and D. R. Teece, “Global Overfishing 
and the Spanish-Canadian Turbot War: Can International Law Protect the High-Seas 
Environment?” Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law & Policy 8 (1997): 89–
125. 
25
 Regulation (EC) No. 1761/95 of 29 June 1995 Amending, for the Second Time, Regulation 
No. 3366/94, L 171 Official Journal 1 (21 July 1995).  
26
 Case T-196/99, Area Cova, SA and Others v. Council of the European Union and 
Commission of the European Communities, 2001 ECR II-3597 [hereinafter Case T-196/99]. 
27
 This is the contractual liability stipulation which states that the Community shall make good 
any damage caused by its institutions in the performance of their duties.  
28
 Regulation 3366/94 recorded that the maximum catch level for Greenland halibut in NAFO 
Sub-areas 2 and 3 in 1995 was as yet unallocated among NAFO Contracting Parties, that the 
NAFO Fisheries Commission was to convene a meeting to decide the allocation, and that 
catches of Greenland halibut would be authorised in 1995 and counted against the quotas 
decided for Member States. Council Regulation (EC) No. 3366/94 of 20 December 1994 
Laying Down for 1995 Certain Conservation and Management Measures for Fishery Resources 
in the Regulatory Area, L 363 Official Journal 60 (31 December 1994).  
29
 Case T-196/99, n. 26 above, para. 64. 
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resources. Such a measure forms an integral part of the CAP as it is intended, in 
particular, to ensure the rational development of resources30 and the availability 
of supplies.31  
 The applicants also alleged that the defendants had misused their powers 
by adopting a bilateral fisheries agreement with Canada and Regulation 
1761/95. Those measures were said to be taken on the basis of EC powers in 
the area of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) in order to achieve objectives 
different from the CFP objectives particularly that of normalising commercial 
relations between Canada and the Community.  
The ECFI recognised that the measures were designed to put an end to the 
fishing conflict between Canada and the EC, but stated that their form, subject-
matter and reasoning, did fall within the context of the CFP for the following 
reasons: Firstly, it was in the interest of EC fishermen to ensure the safety of 
their fishing operations. Secondly, since Canada is represented in several 
international fishing organisations and assumes a significant role there, the 
safeguarding of good relations with that country was important in the interests 
of managing fishing resources at the world level. Maintaining good 
international relations was considered legitimate in the context of all EC 
policies. The institutions must always take account, when legislating in the 
context of a specific policy, its effects on the other activities of the Union, 
particularly that of public interest.32 
The applicants also claimed to have had a legitimate expectation of 
a favourable outcome of the dispute between Canada and the EC and in the 
maintenance of the fishing opportunities which they had enjoyed before it. The 
ECFI noted that “the allocation of quotas cannot in principle create a situation 
of legitimate expectation for economic operators.”33 
It was also alleged that the conservation measure was disproportionate 
vis-à-vis the damage caused to Community vessel owners and manifestly 
                                                 
30
 Treaty Establishing the European Community [consolidated version], Official Journal C 325 
(24 December 2002) 33-184 [hereinafter EC Treaty], Article 33 (1) (a). 
31
 Id., Article 33 (d); Case T-196/99, n. 26 above, para. 76. 
32
 Case T-196/99, n. 26 above, para. 158. 
33
 Id., para. 121. In this case, the ECFI refers to quotas. In this context, however, this concept is 
not to be understood as referring to the fishing opportunities allocated to the Member States and 
derived from a TAC. Rather it refers here to that part of the TAC allocated to the Community as 
a whole. In particular, it is pointed out that economic operators cannot have a legitimate 
expectation that an existing situation which is capable of being altered by the EC institutions in 
the exercise of their discretion will be maintained, especially in an area such as the CAP, in 
which the institutions have wide discretion. That applies even more strongly in the context of 
international negotiations, which imply concessions on either side as well as the negotiation of 
a compromise accepted by all the Contracting Parties. Id., paras 122–124. 
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inappropriate with regard to the objective pursued.34 The ECFI pointed out that 
the fixing of a TAC at a level avoiding the worsening or the diminution of 
a fish stock also served the interests of EC fishermen because it allowed the 
safeguarding of resources in the long term. The other CAP objectives had not 
been sacrificed.35 On the contrary, an approach by the Council taking into 
account only the objective of ensuring a higher standard of living for certain 
fishermen in the short term would have involved a serious risk of making the 
objectives of ensuring the rational development of resources and availability of 
supplies impossible. 
 
 
                                                 
34
 Id., para. 78. On the conformity of a Community legislative instrument with the principle of 
proportionality see Case C-161/96, Südzucker Mannheim v. Hauptzollamt Mannheim, 1998 
ECR I-281 [hereinafter Case C-161/96], para. 31. In Case C-535/03, the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) observed that the principle of proportionality is a general principle of Community 
law and, in the field of fisheries, is embodied in Article 34 (2) of the EC Treaty. That provision 
entrusts the Community legislature with the task of implementing the CAP as formulated in 
Article 33. In particular, a fair standard of living for the agricultural community and the 
availability of supplies needs to be assured, while excluding any discrimination between 
Community producers. The ECJ reiterated that the Community legislature enjoys a wide 
discretion in this field, corresponding to the political responsibilities given to it by Articles 34–
37 of the EC Treaty. See Case C-535/03, Unitymark Ltd, North Sea Fishermen’s Organisation 
v. Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, 2006 ECR I-2689 [hereinafter Case C-
535/03], paras 53–54.  
35
 In pursuing the objectives of the CAP, the EC institutions must secure the permanent 
harmonisation made necessary by any conflicting objectives taken individually and, where 
necessary, give any one of them temporary priority in order to satisfy the demands of the 
economic factors or conditions in view of which their decisions are made. One condition must, 
however, be met, that such harmonisation does not have the effect of rendering impossible the 
realisation of the other objectives. As stressed by the ECFI or ECJ in the following cases: 
Joined Cases T-466/93, T-469/93, T-473/93, T-474/93 and T-477/93, O’Dwyer and Others v. 
Council, 1995 ECR II-2071, para. 80; Case C-179/95, Spain v. Council, 1999 ECR I-6475, 
para. 28; and Case C-324/96, Petridi v. Simou and Others, 1998 ECR I-1333, para. 30. 
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10.3. Cooperation 
 
10.3.1. Global Instruments and Initiatives Guiding Cooperation in the 
North Atlantic 
 
While various FAO instruments may also guide regional cooperation,36 Canada 
and the EU have been particularly influenced towards greater cooperation by 
the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement37 and the December 2006 UN Sustainable 
Fisheries Resolution.38 With the EC ratifying the UN Fish Stocks Agreement on 
19 December 2003 and Canada on 3 August 1999,39 the EC and Canada 
committed to strengthening regional fisheries management organisations in 
light of modern sustainability principles like precaution and the ecosystem 
approach, as well as enhancing regional compliance and enforcement 
arrangements.40 Canada and the EC have subsequently played substantial roles 
in achieving modernisation amendments to the NAFO Convention41 and the EU 
                                                 
36
 Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations’ (FAO) instruments include the 
Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries; International Plans of Action relating to the 
incidental catch of seabirds (IPOA–Seabirds), the conservation of sharks (IPOA–Sharks), 
the management of fishing capacity, and the prevention /deterrence of illegal, unreported and 
unregulated fishing (IPOA–IUU); and the International Guidelines for the Management of 
Deep-Sea Fisheries in the High Seas. The instruments are available through the FAO website: 
<http://www.fao.org/fishery/publications/en> (retrieved 20 November 2008). 
37
 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of 
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 8 September 1995, I.L.M., 34, 
15421580 (1995), entry into force 11 December 2001, available: <daccessdds.un.org/doc/ 
UNDOC/GEN/N95/274/67/PDF/N9527467.pdf?OpenElement> (retrieved 14 November 2008) 
[hereinafter 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement]. 
38
 UN General Assembly, Sustainble fisheries, including through the 1995 Agreement for the 
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 
10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and related instruments, A/RES/61/105 (6 March 2007). 
39
 Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea, Chronological Lists of Ratification, available: 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratification.htm> 
(retrieved 20 November 2008). 
40
 For an overview of the Agreement’s key provisions, see T. Henriksen, G. Hønneland, and 
A. Sydnes, “The Fish Stocks Agreement,” in Henriksen, et al., n. 5 above, pp. 11–59. 
41
 On 28 September 2008, NAFO adopted the Amendment to the Convention on Future 
Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (GC Doc. 07/4), but the amended 
text needs to be ratified by at least three-fourths of the NAFO Contracting Parties. The amended 
text is available at <http://www.nafo.int/about/frames/about.html> (retrieved 20 November 
2008). 
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influenced amendments to the NEAFC Convention.42 They have also 
cooperated in enhancing regional compliance and enforcement arrangements 
although many challenges remain.43 
The 2006 UN Sustainable Fisheries Resolution impelled regional fisheries 
management organisations to adopt and implement various measures to protect 
vulnerable marine ecosystems (VMEs) from bottom fishing activities. 
The identification of VMEs and the determination whether bottom fishing 
could cause significant adverse impacts to such ecosystems was set as 
a priority.44 In areas where VMEs are known to occur or likely to occur, 
RFMOs were urged to close such areas and to ensure conservation and 
management measures were established to prevent significant adverse 
impacts.45 RFMOs were also asked to require their members to address 
                                                 
42
 A “new” NEAFC Convention was adopted through 2004 and 2006 amendments, available 
Convention on Future Multilateral Co-operation in the North-East Atlantic, available: 
<http://www.neafc.org/about/docs/new_convention.pdf> and also <http://www.neafc.org/ 
system/files/%252Fhome/neafc/drupal2_files/london-declarlation_and_new_convention.pdf> 
(both retrieved 20 November 2008) [hereinafter “New” NEAFC Convention]. For the version 
of the convention before 2004 and 2006 amendments, see Convention on Future Multilateral 
Co-operation in the North-East Atlantic, London, 18 November 1980, 1285 U.N.T.S. 129, 
Official Journal L 227, 12 August 1981, entry into force on 17 March 1982, available: 
<http://eurlex.europa.eu/Notice.do?val=86901:cs&lang=en&list=86901:cs,87372:cs,87022:cs,8
7021:cs,&pos=1&page=1&nbl=4&pgs=10&hwords=&checktexte=checkbox&visu=#texte> 
(retrieved 20 November 2008) [hereinafter NEAFC Convention]. Amendments to the NEAFC 
Convention were adopted in 2004 and 2006 by the NEAFC Commission. And even though 
Contracting Parties have agreed to use the convention so amended on a provisional basis, 
pending ratification, these amendments have not been taken into consideration by the present 
overview unless specifically mentioned in the text. The NEAFC Convention replaces the North-
East Atlantic Fisheries Convention of January 1959 following the extension of states’ 
jurisdiction over living resources in their adjacent waters to up to 200 nm. For a historical 
overview of the development of regional fisheries management and RFMOs in the North 
Atlantic, see S. S. Gezelius, “The Arrival of Modern Fisheries Management in the North 
Atlantic: A Historical Overview,” in S. S. Gezelius and J. Raakjær, eds, Making Fisheries 
Management Work: Implementation of Policies for Sustainable Fisheries (Dordrecht: Springer, 
2008), pp. 27–40. 
43
 M. Arbuckle, B. Atkinson, and G. Valentina, Performance Review Panel Report of the North 
East Atlantic Fisheries Commission, NEAFC (6 November 2006), available: 
<http://www.neafc.org/system/files/performance-review-final-edited.pdf> (retrieved 20 Nov-
ember 2008) [hereinafter the NEAFC Performance Report]. This document was a result of the 
agreement by NEAFC members to regularly assess NEAFC performance in relation to the 
NEAFC Convention, n. 42 above. Section 3.6 et seq of the NEAFC Performance Report 
especially examines the role of NEAFC in a regional and international context. Section 4.6 
concludes that there is room for improvement in the relationship between NEAFC and the 
Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR). 
44
 UN General Assembly, n. 38 above, para. 83(b). 
45
 Id. at para. 83(c). 
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encounters with VMEs by vessels flying their flag. Vessels encountering 
vulnerable areas, such as cold water corals and sponge grounds, should be 
required to cease bottom fishing and to report the encounter so appropriate 
measures can be adopted for the relevant site.46  
Canada and the EU, spurred on by the UN Resolution, jointly drafted 
a proposal for bringing NAFO into conformity with the VME protection 
commitments. The proposal was adopted in revised form at the Inter-sessional 
Meeting for the NAFO Fisheries Commission in May 2008,47 and a new 
chapter on bottom fisheries in the NAFO Regulatory Area was added to the 
2008 NAFO Conservation and Enforcement Measures.48 The provisions, inter 
alia, called for the mapping of sites where VMEs are known or likely to occur49 
and assessments of proposed bottom fishing activities in VME areas.50 The 
Fisheries Commission is authorised to adopt a range of measures to prevent 
significant adverse impact on VMEs, including prohibiting or restricting bottom 
fishing activities and requiring changes in gear design and/or deployment.51 
Contracting Parties are required to have their flagged vessels cease bottom 
fishing when VMEs are encountered and to report encounters.52 The terms of 
reference for an ad hoc working group of mangers and scientists on VMEs were 
also included in the provisions.53 The working group is to provide advice to the 
Fisheries Commission on VME protection and to develop operational 
procedures relating to encounters with VMEs.54 
 
                                                 
46
 Id. at para. 83(d). 
47
 NAFO, Report of the Fisheries Commission Inter-Sessional Meeting, 30 April–7 May 2008, 
Montreal, Quebec, Canada, NAFO/FC Doc. 08/04, Annex 22. 
48
 NAFO, Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization Conservation and Enforcement Measures, 
available: <http://www.nafo.int/fisheries/frames/regulations.html> (retrieved 20 November 
2008) [hereinafter NAFO C&E Measures], NAFO/FC Doc. 08/1 (Revised), Chapter Ibis. 
49
 Id., Article 4(1). 
50
 Id., Article 4(2)(3). 
51
 Id., Article 4(5). 
52
 Id., Article 5. 
53
 Id., Article 4(4) and Annex 1 to Chapter Ibis. 
54
 Id. 
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10.3.2. Cooperation at the EU Level 
 
10.3.2.1. The Community’s Competences on the External Level 
 
Although Member States’ vessels have, through the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea,55 a right to fish on the high seas, high seas’ 
fishing is extensively regulated by the CFP. Negotiations with third countries 
for access of Member States’ vessels to the fishing zones of third states, and 
vice versa, are entirely within EC competence. The transfer of competence from 
the Member States to the EC is therefore not confined to Community vessels 
fishing in Community waters, but to wherever these vessels operate.56 The EC 
has one of the largest fishing fleets in the world. A significant part of the EC 
fishing sector depends on access to non-EC resources, i.e., those which are 
shared with third states in the waters under their jurisdiction or international 
waters. 
The process of transfer of external relations powers to the EC has been 
particularly marked in the fisheries sector. In the absence of specific provisions 
in the EC Treaty,57 the general system of EC law on its external relations is 
relevant.58 As an international organisation created by a treaty, the EC has legal 
personality.59 This means that in its external relations the EC enjoys the 
                                                 
55
 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 396 [hereinafter LOS Convention]. 
56
 Council Regulation (EC) No. 2371/2002 of 20 December 2002 on the Conservation and 
Sustainable Exploitation of Fisheries Resources under the Common Fisheries Policy, Article 1 
(1), L 358 Official Journal 59–80 (31 December 2002) [hereinafter Regulation 2371/02]. This 
does not mean that there are no situations where Member States’ fishing vessels can conduct 
high seas fishing for species or stocks for which neither the EC nor a regional fisheries 
organisation have yet prescribed catch restrictions.  
57
 The EC Treaty does give explicit powers to the EC to act on the international level, but these 
relate only to restricted fields such as commercial agreements, association agreements with 
third states, and the environment. The only express treaty-making power relevant to fisheries is 
found in Article 133(3) of the EC Treaty (ex Article 113 of the EEC Treaty) on the common 
commercial policy, which indirectly authorises the EC to enter into treaties with third states 
relating to trade in fishery products. Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, 
25 March 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty], Article 113; EC Treaty, n. 30 above, 
Article 133 (3).  
58
 Joined Cases 3, 4 and 6/76, Officier van Justitie v. Kramer, 1976 ECR 1279, para. 16 
[hereinafter Kramer Case]. 
59
 Article 281 (ex Article 210 of the EEC Treaty) of the EC Treaty lays down the EC’s legal 
personality. The legal personality of an international organisation may also be inferred from the 
powers or purposes of the organisation and its practice, as confirmed by the International Court 
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capacity to enter into international commitments, i.e., to conclude treaties.60 
The EC’s treaty-making powers are thus of two kinds: those expressly 
conferred on it by the EC Treaty and those that may be implied from its 
provisions.61 
The most radical expansion of the EC’s external fisheries competences 
has stemmed from the case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Starting 
with Case 22/70, the ECJ developed the parallelism doctrine, which means that 
the EC’s external treaty-making competence mirrors its internal legislative 
competence.62 In the Kramer Case, the ECJ pointed out that the competence to 
legislate on the internal level in fisheries matters flowed from Article 43 of the 
European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty (Article 37 of the EC Treaty). 
According to the parallelism doctrine, the EC thus enjoys treaty-making powers 
                                                                                                                                  
of Justice (ICJ) in the Reparation for Injuries Case. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the 
Service of the United Nations, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 174.  
60
 The authority to do so in a specific field not only arises from an express conferment by the 
treaty, but may equally flow implicitly from other EC Treaty provisions, from an act of 
accession, and from any measure adopted within the framework of those provisions by the EC 
legislature.  
61
 Kramer Case, n. 58 above, paras 19–20. 
62
 This theory was further developed in Opinion 1/76:  
[W]henever Community law has created for the institutions of the Community powers 
within its internal system for attaining a specific objective, the Community has 
authority to enter into the international commitments necessary for the attainment of 
that objective even in the absence of an express provision in that connection. 
Opinion 1/76, European Laying-up Fund for Inland Waterway Vessels, 1977 ECR 741, 3rd 
Recital.  
As regards the exclusiveness of this competence, the ECJ has observed that: 
[e]ach time the Community, with a view to implementing a common policy [emphasis 
added] envisaged by the Treaty, adopts provisions laying down common rules, 
whatever form these may take, the Member States no longer have the right, acting 
individually or collectively, to undertake such obligations with third States which 
affect those rules. 
Case 22/70, Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the European 
Communities, European Agreement on Road Transport, 1971 ECR 263, para. 17 [hereinafter 
ERTA Case].  
Although previously considered unclear and controversial, the ECJ has clarified to some degree 
the exact scope of the implied powers, see: Opinion 2/91, Convention Nº 170 of the 
International Labour Organization Concerning Safety in the Use of Chemicals at Work, 1993 
ECR I-1061; Opinion 1/94, Competence of the Community to Conclude International 
Agreements Concerning Services and the Protection of Intellectual Property - Article 228 (6) of 
the EC Treaty, 1994 ECR I-5267; Opinion 2/92, Competence of the Community or One of its 
Institutions to Participate in the Third Revised Decision of the OECD on National Treatment, 
1995 ECR 521. 
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in relation to fisheries.63 On the basis of Articles 5 (Article 10 of the EC Treaty) 
and 116 EEC Treaty,64 the ECJ held that: 
 
Member States participating in the [North-East Atlantic Fisheries] 
Convention and in other similar agreements are now not only under a 
duty not to enter into any commitment within the framework of those 
conventions which could hinder the Community in carrying out the tasks 
entrusted to it by Article 102 of the Act of Accession, but also under a 
duty to proceed by common action within the fisheries Commission. It 
further follows therefore that as soon as the Community institutions have 
initiated the procedure for implementing the provisions of the said 
[article], and at the latest within the period laid down by [it], those 
institutions and the Member States will be under a duty to use all the 
political and legal means at their disposal in order to ensure the 
participation of the Community in the Convention and in other similar 
agreements.65 
 
In Case C-258/89,66 it was argued that the EEC has no authority to 
independently adopt TACs and quotas with respect to international waters. In 
this case Spain accepted the result, i.e., the existence of external Community 
                                                 
63
 Documents Concerning the Accession to the European Communities of the Kingdom of 
Denmark, Ireland, the Kingdom of Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, Act Concerning the Conditions of Accession and the Adjustments to the 
Treaties, Part 2 Adjustments to the Treaties, Article 102 [hereinafter 1972 Act of Accession]. 
Support was found in the 1972 Act of Accession, in Regulation 2141/70 and moreover in the 
very nature of things that:  
the rule-making authority of the Community ratione materiae also extends – in so far 
as the Member States have similar authority under public international law – to fishing 
on the high seas. [I]t followed from the very duties and powers which EEC law had 
established and assigned to the EEC institutions on the internal level that the 
Community had authority to enter into international commitments for the conservation 
of the resources of the sea. 
Kramer Case, n. 58 above, para. 30/33. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2141/70 of 20 October 
1970 on the Establishment of a Common Structural Policy for the Fishing Industry, L 236 
Official Journal 1–4, Article 1 (27 October 1970) [hereinafter Regulation 2141/70]. 
64
 Under Article 116 of the EEC Treaty it is provided that:  
[f]rom the end of the transitional period onwards, Member States shall, in respect of all 
matters of particular interest to the common market proceed within the framework of 
international organisations of an economic character only by common action. 
EEC Treaty, n. 57 above, Article 116. This article was not withheld in the EC Treaty. 
65
 Kramer Case, n. 58 above, paras 44–45.  
66
 Case C-258/89, Commission of the European Communities v. Kingdom of Spain, 1991 ECR 
I-3977.  
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powers, but not the premise of the existence of internal Community powers. It 
was contended that independent authority to limit catches on the high seas 
could not be vested in the Community, since the Member States had no such 
powers that they could have transferred to the Community.67 Advocate General 
Darmon set aside this argument by observing that the de facto freedom which 
states in practice grant to their fishermen by not laying down rules in respect of 
the conservation of stocks on the high seas did not in any way challenge the 
fundamental principle that the State is empowered, from the point of view of 
public international law, to impose any restrictions on catches on the high 
seas.68 Spain also contended that a unilateral limitation by the Community of 
fishing activities on the high seas would be detrimental to its fishermen without 
being effective since certain non-Member States do not impede upon the 
freedom of their fishing fleets. The ECJ considered catch restrictions outside 
the Community zone essential in light of the actual CFP objectives. It found 
that consideration solely of the stock in Community waters would scarcely be 
effective and would undermine the objective of conserving the species 
concerned, since those species would not be subject to any quotas once they 
moved outside the Community zone.69 
 
 
10.3.2.2. EC Participation in Regional Fisheries Organisations 
 
Due to the EC’s exclusive external competence, it is generally not possible for 
the Member States to participate as separate members in RFMOs. Since the 
inception of the CFP, the EC has therefore gradually replaced its Member 
States in most RFMOs. The EC is a contracting party to eleven RFMOs and is 
in the process of joining others.70  
                                                 
67
 Id., Opinion of Advocate General Darmon, paras 52–53.  
68
 Id., para. 54. 
69
 Id., Opinion of Advocate General Darmon, paras 12–13. In Case C-405/92, the ECJ took any 
doubt away by pointing out that: 
[w]here the high seas are concerned, the Community has the same rule-making 
authority in matters within its jurisdiction as that conferred under international law on 
the State whose flag the vessel is flying or in which it is registered. It has in particular 
competence to adopt for vessels flying the flag of a Member State or registered in a 
Member State, measures for the conservation of fishery resources of the high seas. 
Case C-405/92, Etablissements Armand Mondiet SA v. Armement Islais SARL, 1993 ECR I-
6133, para. 12. 
70
 The RFMOs to which the EC is a contracting party are: ICCAT, NAFO, NEAFC, the Indian 
Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC), NASCO, the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), the General Fisheries Council for the Mediterranean 
(GFCM), the Western and Central Atlantic Fishery Commission (WECAFC), Fishery 
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At present the RFMOs cover practically all the high seas. There are 
a wide variety of RFMOs. Some were set up under FAO while others were 
created independently. Some cover all the biological resources in a given zone; 
others focus on one stock or a group of stocks. The area covered by an RFMO 
may be limited to the high seas or to EEZ, or may include both.  
Member States can retain or become members of RFMOs under 
exceptional circumstances. This is the case where other states are not 
favourably disposed towards EC membership such as the Inter-American 
Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC),71 which was established by the 1949 
Convention between the United States of America and the Republic of Costa 
Rica.72 The EC is a contracting party to the Agreement on the International 
Dolphin Conservation Program (AIDCP),73 whose operation has been entrusted 
to the secretariat of the IATTC. In 1999, the EC signed the AIDCP.74 Contrary 
to the AIDCP, accession of new members to the 1949 Convention (IATTC 
convention) is limited to states. However, an amendment process was launched 
in 1999 with the adoption of the so-called Guayaquil Protocol, so that regional 
economic integration organisations could become members. However, the entry 
into force of this protocol, proved to be long.75 Therefore the EC agreed to 
allow Spain, the only EC Member State whose vessels operate in the area, to 
become a member of IATTC. Spain’s accession was on a temporary basis and 
                                                                                                                                  
Committee for the Eastern and Central Atlantic (CECAF), the South-East Atlantic Fisheries 
Organisation (SEAFO), and the Commission for the Conservation and Management of Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WFCPC). On the changing 
role of RFMOs and the Community participation therein, see generally Commission of 
European Communities, Community Participation in Regional Fisheries Organisations, 
Communication from the Commission, COM(1999) 613 (Brussels, 8 December 1999).  
71
 See more, Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) website at  
<http://www.iattc.org/> (retrieved 14 December 2008). 
72
 Convention for the Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, 
Washington, 31 May 1949, 80 U.N.T.S. 3. This convention entered into force on 3 March 1950 
[hereinafter 1949 Convention]. The Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) has 
been given competence to regulate highly migratory fish stocks in the Eastern Pacific Ocean. 
IATTC membership comprises fourteen coastal and fishing states with interests in the region. 
73
 Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation Program (AIDCP), Washington, 15 
May 1998, entry into force 15 February 1999, available: <http://www.iattc.org/PDFFiles2/ 
AIDCP-(amended-Oct-2007).pdf > (retrieved 22 April 2009). 
74
 Council Decision 1999/337/EC of 26 April 1999 on the Signature by the European 
Community of the Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation Programme, L 132 
Official Journal 1–27 (27 May 1999); Council Decision 1999/386/EC of 7 June 1999 on the 
Provisional Application by the European Community of the Agreement on the International 
Dolphin Conservation Programme, L 147 Official Journal 23 (12 June 1999).  
75
 At the time of writing, the protocol had been signed by just eight IATTC members, and 
ratified by only four among them. It will only enter into force once all IATTC parties have 
ratified it. 
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on account of “unique circumstances.” It was also without any precedent-
creating authority and could not affect the EC’s exclusive competence in 
fisheries matters.76 Even under this exceptional regime, it took until 2003 for 
Spain to receive the nihil obstat from all other members to accede to IATTC. 
IATTC adopted a new IATTC Convention text in June 2003 to replace the 1949 
Convention, and the EC signed this so-called Antigua Convention on 22 May 
2006.77 
It is also possible for both the EC and the Member States to be members 
of an RFMO when the issues addressed concern shared competences. For 
instance, the conservation and rational use of marine living resources in the seas 
surrounding Antarctica takes place within the framework of the Convention on 
the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR)78 and 
within the broader framework of the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS).79 The 
main instruments within the ATS are the Antarctic Treaty,80 the Convention for 
the Conservation of the Antarctic Seals,81 and CCAMLR. The EC is a member 
of the CCAMLR Commission, the Convention’s regulatory body, alongside 
several EC Member States. The EC and its Member States share competences 
due to its broad scope, but also because it is part of the ATS and therefore 
subject to the sensitive “agreement to disagree” on the sovereignty situation.82  
                                                 
76
 Council Decision 1999/405/EC of 10 June 1999 Authorising the Kingdom of Spain to 
Accede to the Convention Establishing the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission on 
a Temporary Basis (IATTC), L 155 Official Journal 37–38, 5th Recital (22 June 1999). 
According to this Decision, Spain is required to denounce the 1949 Convention on the date of 
the Community’s accession thereto.  
77
 The Antigua Convention (Convention for Cooperation in the Protection and Sustainable 
Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the Northeast Pacific, Antigua, 
Guatemala, 18 February 2002) will enter into force after the deposit of the seventh instrument 
of ratification by a current contracting party to IATTC. Council Decision 2006/539/EC of 
22 May 2006 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Community of the Convention for 
the Strengthening of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission established by the 1949 
Convention between the United States of America and the Republic of Costa Rica, L 224 
Official Journal 22 (16 August 2006). 
78
 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, Canberra, 20 May 
1980, 19 I.L.M. 837 (1980). This convention entered into force on 7 April 1982. 
79
 See Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty website at <http://www.ats.aq> (retrieved 
15 December 2008). 
80
 The Antarctic Treaty, Washington, DC, 1 December 1959, 402 U.N.T.S. 71. This convention 
entered into force on 23 June 1961. 
81
 Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, London, 1 June 1972, 11 I.L.M. 251. 
This convention entered into force on 11 March 1978. 
82
 See E. J. Molenaar, “CCAMLR and Southern Ocean Fisheries,” International Journal of 
Marine and Coastal and Law 16 (2002): 465–499. At the 18th annual CCAMLR meeting in 
1999, the division of competence between the EC and its Member States was implicitly 
challenged by means of a notification by the EC Commission to engage in an exploratory 
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A similar situation arises in connection with FAO fishery advisory bodies 
such as the Fishery Committee for the Eastern and Central Atlantic (CECAF),83 
the Western and Central Atlantic Fishery Commission (WECAFC),84 and the 
General Fisheries Council for the Mediterranean (GFCM).85 The rationale for 
the continued participation of EC Member States within these bodies 
predominantly appears to be due to the development and cooperation objectives 
of these bodies, which is an area in which the EC and its Member States share 
competence.86 Scientific research in fisheries is another issue where 
competence is shared, hence the Member States continued membership of the 
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) alongside the EC. 
The Community has a sizeable fleet conducting bottom fishing activities 
in certain high seas areas not covered by a RFMO. Through Regulation 
734/2008 on the protection of VMEs in the high seas from the adverse impacts 
of bottom fishing gears, the Community now protects vulnerable high seas 
marine ecosystems from the destructive effects of such activities.87 Prior to this 
Regulation, the Community had only adopted measures to close bottom fishing 
in areas within Community waters and on the high seas within the framework 
of all existing RFMOs empowered to regulate bottom fisheries. This regulation 
seems to end the stalemate in the sensitive political debate regarding the scope 
of the Community’s conservation competence.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                  
fishery for Patagonian toothfish on behalf of a Portuguese vessel, even though Portugal was not 
a party to the CCAMLR Convention at that time. Strong objections during the meeting and 
afterwards, by both EC Member States and third states, compelled the EC Commission to 
inform the CCAMLR Executive Secretary that it intended to suspend the exploratory fishery for 
technical reasons. Council Regulation (EC) No. 601/2004 of 22 March 2004 Laying Down 
Certain Control Measures Applicable to Fishing Activities in the Area Covered by the 
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, L 97 Official Journal 
16 (1 April 2004). 
83
 Fishery Committee for the Eastern Central Atlantic, Instituted by FAO Council Resolution 
1/48 (June 1967). 
84
 Western Central Atlantic Fishery Commission. Established by FAO Council Resolution 4/61 
(November 1973). 
85
 Agreement for the Establishment of a General Fisheries Council for the Mediterranean, 
Rome, 24 September 1949, 126 U.N.T.S. 239. This agreement entered into force 20 February 
1952. 
86
 Molenaar, n. 82 above, p. 160. 
87
 Council Regulation (EC) No. 734/2008, of 15 July 2008 on the Protection of Vulnerable 
Marine Ecosystems in the High Seas From the Adverse Impacts of Bottom Fishing Gears, 
L 201 Official Journal 8–13 (30 July 2008).  
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10.3.2.3. The EC and Negotiation of Conservation Agreements  
 
The European Commission is responsible for the negotiation of fisheries 
agreements, whereas the Council, after consulting Parliament, concludes it.88 
Such an agreement is binding on the EC institutions as well as on its Member 
States.89 The general practice is for the Commission to negotiate in line with 
negotiating mandates received from the Council. Before taking effect, the 
agreements must be adopted by the Council in the form of a regulation based on 
Articles 37 and 300 of the EC Treaty.90 
In areas outside EC competence, Member States retain their right of 
individual action and the right to enter into treaties. In situations where the EC 
has treaty-making competence but such competence is not exclusive, it is 
shared with the Member States.91 A classic example of this is to be found in the 
LOS Convention.92 For the purpose of the LOS Convention, conservation and 
management of fisheries resources were identified as exclusive EC powers, as 
were some environmental protection and other competences. The remaining 
matters were areas where legislative powers were retained by the Member 
                                                 
88
 EC Treaty, n. 30 above, Article 300 (1) & (3). This basic procedure varies both in terms of 
voting rules within the Council and the extent of parliamentary involvement according to the 
subject matter of the agreement and the procedures applicable to the adoption of internal 
measures. For an early account see P. M. Leopold, “The External Relations Power of the EEC 
in Theory and Practice,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 26 (1977): 54–80. 
Generally see M. Koskenniemi, International Law Aspect of the European Union (The Hague, 
Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1998); A. Dashwood, and C. Hillion, The General Law of 
EC External Relations (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2000).  
89
 EC Treaty, n. 30 above, Article 300 (1) & (7). 
90
 Note that this requires prior consultation with the Parliament. 
91
 Competence will be shared according to Macleod et al., where that consequence flows from 
the EC Treaty article conferring power on the EC; 2) the EC has potential competence that 
could be exclusive when exercised but which has not yet been exercised; 3) the subject matter 
of the treaty falls partly within the field of the EC’s exclusive treaty-making powers and partly 
outside; 4) the EC’s treaty-making powers derive from internal EC rules which set minimum 
standards; and 5) in certain limited areas, such as intellectual property, where EC and Member 
State competence can co-exist without either displacing the other. I. MacLeod, I. D. Hendry, 
and S. Hyett, The External Relations of the European Communities (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1996), pp. 56–63 & 63–67; R. R. Churchill, “The EC and its Role in Some Issues of 
International Fisheries Law” and E. Hey, “The Fisheries Provisions of the LOS Convention,” 
both in E. Hey (ed.), Developments in International Fisheries Law (The Hague, Boston: Kluwer 
Law International, 1999), pp. 536–537.  
92
 A. W. Koers, “Participation of the European Economic Community in a New Law of the Sea 
Convention,” American Journal of International Law 7 (1979): 426–443; K. R. Simmonds, 
“The European Economic Community and the New Law of the Sea,” Hague Recueil 218, no. 1 
(1989): 108–157; R. Simmonds, “The Community’s Declaration Upon Signature of the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea,” Common Market Law Review 23 (1986): 521–544. 
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States. It was thus not possible for the Community and the Member States to 
assume independently of each other, the obligations and rights enshrined in the 
LOS Convention. Therefore, the practice has arisen of concluding “mixed 
agreements” to which both the EC and its Member States are parties. They need 
the signature and ratification by each Member State, in addition to the formal 
conclusion by the EC. With respect to the negotiation, conclusion and 
implementation of such mixed agreements, the ECJ has prescribed an 
obligation on the EC and the Member States to ensure close cooperation 
between them.93 
Several issues other than conservation have caused some controversy in 
determining whether the EC has treaty-making powers, and if so, the 
exclusivity of these powers. The precise scope of the EC’s exclusive external 
competence has traditionally been a subject of dispute between the 
Commission’s broad interpretation viewpoint and the Council’s restrictive 
viewpoint, and it has been the task of the ECJ to clarify the matter.94  
An illustrative example of this tension in relation to the Community’s 
membership in fisheries organisations and some of the procedural difficulties 
which may arise are evident in Case C-25/94.95 In this case, the Commission 
requested that the ECJ annul the decision96 giving Member States the right to 
vote in the FAO concerning the adoption of the draft Agreement to Promote 
Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by 
                                                 
93
 Ruling 1/78 Delivered Pursuant to the Third Paragraph of Article 103 of the European 
Atomic Energy Commission Treaty, Draft Convention of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, Facilities and Transports, 1978 E.C.R. 
2151, paras 34–36; Opinion 2/91, n. 62 above, para. 36; Opinion 1/94, n. 62 above, para. 108.  
94
 Member States are reluctant to leave international relations to the exclusive competence of 
the Community. The development of subordination clauses and mixed agreements has been 
quite deliberately aimed in practice at stunting the use of exclusive Community competence. 
Mixed agreements need to be signed and ratified by all Member States, thus it normally takes 
several years before they can enter into force. In order to speed up the entry into force of the 
parts of mixed agreements that deal with pure EC competences, the EC often makes use of so-
called interim agreements under EC competence. Interim agreements exclude, therefore, the 
articles under Member State competence. As a result, interim agreements can enter into force as 
soon as the Community has concluded the agreement. Interim agreements do not need to be 
signed and ratified by the individual Member States. See M. Cremona, “The Doctrine of 
Exclusivity and the Position of Mixed Agreements in the External Relations of the European 
Community,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 2 (1982): 393–428; D. O’Keeffe and 
H. G. Schermers, Mixed Agreements (The Hague: Deventer, Kluwer, 1983), p. ix; A. Rosas, 
“The EU and Mixed Agreements,” in Dashwood & Hillion, n. 88 above, pp. 200–220. 
95
 Case C-25/94, Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the European Union, 
1996 ECR I-1469. 
96
 Decision of the Fisheries Council of 22 November 1993.  
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Fishing Vessels on the High Seas.97 The FAO provides for a system of 
alternative exercise of the rights attached to membership between the EC and 
its Member States. This allows the Commission to speak and vote where an 
agenda item is within exclusive competence of the Community. If an agenda 
item contains matters containing elements both of national and Community 
competence, the Commission can only represent the EC on the issues that fall 
within its exclusive competence. Registration of vessels is a Member State 
competence. During negotiations on the draft agreement, the clauses relating to 
registration and flagging were removed. Subsequently, the Commission is 
considered having the right to vote. The ECJ pointed out that:  
 
[w]here it is apparent that the subject-matter of an agreement or 
convention falls partly within the competence of the Community and 
partly within that of its Member States, it is essential to ensure close 
cooperation between the Member States and the Community institutions, 
both in the process of negotiation and conclusion and in the fulfilment of 
the commitments entered into. That obligation to cooperate flows from 
the requirement of unity in the international representation of the 
Community.98 
 
In addition, “the Community institutions and the Member States must take all 
necessary steps to ensure the best possible co-operation in that regard.”99 
The ECJ concluded that the Council was wrong in maintaining that the draft 
agreement concerned an issue not within the exclusive competence of the 
Community. Accordingly, it was for the Commission to vote for the adoption of 
the draft agreement.100  
 
                                                 
97
 Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management 
Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, 24 November 1993, U.N.T.S., 2221 (2003): 91–
129, entry into force 24 April 2003, available: <www.fao.org/legal/treaties/012t-e.htm> 
(retrieved 20 November 2008) [hereinafter 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement]. 
98
 Case C-25/94, n. 95 above, para. 46; Ruling Ruling 1/78, n. 93 above, paras 34–36; Opinion 
2/91, n. 62 above, para. 36; Opinion 1/94, n. 62 above, para. 108. 
99
 Opinion 2/91, n. 62 above, para. 38. 
100
 Case C-25/94, n. 95 above, para. 50. 
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10.4. Challenges 
 
10.4.1. Integrating the Environmental Dimension into the CFP 
 
As discussed above, EC internal competences premises action on the external 
level. Thus, the competence of the EC to act in the international arena is 
a question of Community law rather than of international law. During the 2002 
CFP reform there was a general consensus that the CFP was failing to achieve 
its objectives of conserving fish stocks, protecting the marine environment, 
ensuring the economic viability of European fleets, and providing good quality 
food to consumers. A 1999 survey in the North East Atlantic confirmed that 40 
out of the 60 main commercial fish stocks were outside safe biological limits. 
The most severely depleted species was cod. The European Commission’s 2001 
Green Book painted a very bleak picture of EC fish stocks.101 The Commission 
then considered the possibility of reviewing the whole of the CFP framework. 
The 2002 CFP reform set broader objectives and resulted in several significant 
changes. Firstly, noting that the CFP traditionally dealt with environmental 
matters in a reactive way rather than integrating environmental concerns into all 
management considerations in a proactive matter,102 the Commission concluded 
that the CFP needed to equip itself with the necessary tools of proactive 
management of environmental concerns. Initially, the fundamental element of 
environmental integration in fisheries was identified as the change in attitude of 
management through the adoption of an ecosystem-based approach to fisheries 
management. Secondly, the environmental policy principles needed to be 
applied to fisheries management. With the exception of the precautionary 
principle in the management of single fish stocks, limited work had been 
carried out to ascertain their implications to fisheries management.103 
                                                 
101
 Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper on the Future of the Common 
Fisheries Policy, Volume I, Communication from the Commission, COM(2001) 135 (Brussels, 
20 March 2001). 
102
 Commission of the European Communities, Elements of a Strategy for the Integration of 
Environmental Protection Requirements into the Common Fisheries Policy 5, Communication 
from the Commission, COM(2001) 143 final (Brussels, 16 March 2001) [hereinafter 
COM(2001) 143 final]. 
103
 Commission of the European Communities, Partnership for Integration, A strategy for 
Integrating Environment into European Union Policies, Communication from the Commission, 
COM(1998) 333 (Brussels, June 1998); COM(2001) 143 final, n. 102 above, pp. 21–22. On 
21 June 1998, the Council endorsed a Community Strategy on Biological Diversity. This 
strategy called for the generation of sector-based action plans. With regard to the fisheries, the 
objectives were twofold: firstly, to conserve commercially fished species of marine fish in order 
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The new Regulation 2371/02 provides the legal basis to adopt measures 
to reduce negative impacts on the environment. It is explicitly stated that the 
CFP must provide for coherent measures concerning the “limitation of the 
environmental impact of fishing.”104 To this end, it sees the precautionary 
approach when taking protection and conservation measures as an appropriate 
tool.105 The gradual implementation of an ecosystem-based approach to 
fisheries management is further envisaged.106 Sustainable exploitation is 
explicitly linked with minimising the effects on marine ecosystems.107 
However, the Regulation, as opposed to the precautionary approach, does not 
provide a definition of the ecosystem approach.  
The conservation measures to be adopted in the pursuit of sustainable 
fishing activities may include measures for each stock or group of stocks aimed 
at limiting fishing mortality and the environmental impacts of fishing activities. 
However, the Regulation is specific about technical measures, stating that they 
must be adopted to reduce the impact of fishing activities on marine ecosystems 
and non-target species.108 Focusing on conservation, the recent trend is for a 
multi-annual approach to management and recovery plans. For stocks at or 
within safe biological limits, multi-annual management plans will be adopted to 
ensure the objective of sustainable exploitation. For stocks outside safe 
biological limits,109 the adoption of multi-annual recovery plans is an absolute 
                                                                                                                                  
to achieve sustainability of stocks, fishing opportunities and food supply and, secondly, to 
reduce the impact of fishing operations on non-target species and marine habitats. It therefore 
envisaged the application of the precautionary approach to the setting of TACs. Commission of 
the European Communities, A European Community Biodiversity Strategy, Communication 
from the Commission, COM(1998) 42 (Brussels, 4 February 1998); Commission of the 
European Communities, Application of the Precautionary Principle and Multiannual 
Arrangements for Setting TACs, Communication from the Commission, COM(2000) 803 final 
(Brussels, 1 December 2000). 
104
 Regulation 2371/02, n. 56 above, Article 1 (2) (b). 
105
 Id. 
106
 Id., Article 2(1), which reads: “For this purpose, the Community shall apply the 
precautionary approach in taking measures designed to protect and conserve living aquatic 
resources, to provide for their sustainable exploitation and to minimise the impact of fishing 
activities on marine eco-systems. It shall aim at a progressive implementation of an eco-system 
based approach to fisheries management.” 
107
 Article 3(e) reads “sustainable exploitation means the exploitation of a stock in such a way 
that the future exploitation of the stock will not be prejudiced and that it does not have 
a negative impact on the marine eco-systems.” 
108
 Id., Article 4(g)(iv). 
109
 According to Article 3(l) of Regulation 2371/02, “safe biological limits” means indicators of 
the state of a stock or of its exploitation inside which there is a low risk of transgressing certain 
limit reference points. 
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priority.110 During the years following the CFP reform, the Council commenced 
implementation of multi-annual plans by adopting three recovery plans for 
stocks with a status “outside safe biological limits.”111 Recovery plans targeting 
species outside Community waters have also been adopted, e.g., the Greenland 
halibut recovery plan, managed by NAFO.112  
 
 
10.4.2. Putting the Precautionary Approach into Practice 
 
10.4.2.1. NAFO and the Precautionary Approach 
 
If measured by the number of fish stocks subject to a directed fishing 
moratorium because of their depleted status, NAFO’s record of precautionary 
fisheries management can only be described as poor. For 2008, eight groundfish 
stocks were subject to a directed fishing ban. Those stocks included: 3L, 3M 
and 3N cod; 3LN redfish; 3LNO and 3M American plaice; and 3L and 3NO 
witch flounder.113 
NAFO has moved to formally adopt the precautionary approach on two 
main fronts. At the 2004 annual meeting, the Fisheries Commission adopted the 
                                                 
110
 Id., Article 5(2). 
111
 Council Regulation (EC) No. 423/2004 of 26 February 2004 Establishing Measures for the 
Recovery of Cod Stocks, L 70 Official Journal 8–11 (9 March 2004); Council Regulation (EC) 
No. 811/2004 of 21 April 2004 Establishing Measures for the Recovery of the Northern Hake 
Stock, L 150 Official Journal 1–11 (30 April 2004); Council Regulation (EC) No. 2166/05 of 
20 December 2005 Establishing Measures for the Recovery of the Southern Hake and Norway 
lobster Stocks in the Cantabrian Sea and Western Iberian Peninsula and Amending Regulation 
(EC) No. 850/98 for the Conservation of Fishery Resources Through Technical Measures for 
the Protection of Juveniles of Marine Organisms, L 345 Official Journal 5–10 (28 December 
2005). 
112
 Council Regulation (EC) No. 2115/2005 of 20 December 2005 Establishing a Recovery Plan 
for Greenland Halibut in the Framework of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organisation, 
L 340 Official Journal 3–6 (23 December 2005). Council Regulation (EC) No. 643/2007 of 11 
June 2007 amending Regulation (EC) No. 41/2007 as Concerns the Recovery Plan for Bluefin 
Tuna recommended by the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, L 
151 Official Journal 1–16 (13 June 2007). See also Council Regulation (EC) No. 1559/2007 of 
17 December 2007 Establishing a Multi-annual Recovery Plan for Bluefin Tuna in the Eastern 
Atlantic and Mediterranean and Amending Regulation (EC) No. 520/2007, L 340 Official 
Journal 8–24 (22 December 2007). 
113
 NAFO C&E Measures, n. 48 above, NAFO/FC Doc. 08/01 (Revised), Annex I.A, Annual 
Quota Table. Bans on fishing capelin and shrimp in NAFO area 2NO were also in force.  
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NAFO Precautionary Approach Framework.114 The Framework provides 
guidance for setting fishing mortality and stock biomass reference points115 and 
suggests management strategies according to five zones (safe, overfishing, 
cautionary, danger, and collapse).116 In September 2007, NAFO Contracting 
Parties agreed to give the precautionary approach a legal foundation through an 
amended Convention.117 Article III of the modernised Convention requires 
Contracting Parties individually and collectively to apply the precautionary 
approach in accordance with Article 6 of the 1995 UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement.118 
However, practical implementation of the precautionary approach has 
been thwarted in at least four main ways. Firstly, the Scientific Council has not 
been able to determine reference points for many stocks partly due to limited 
scientific data as well as stocks whose reference points have not been 
determined. These stocks include white hake in Divisions 3NOPs,119 capelin in 
Divisions 3NO,120 redfish in Divisions 3LN and in Divisions 3O,121 thorny 
skate in Divisions 3LNO,122 and witch founder in Divisions 3NO.123 
Secondly, there has been the all too common political over-riding of 
scientific advice. For example, at the 29th meeting of the Fisheries Commission 
in September 2007, the Commission set various TACs for 2008 above the 
recommended scientific advice. A few instances are as follows: 
 
• Redfish in Division 3M, TAC of 8,500 tonnes (above the Scientific 
Council’s advice of not exceeding 5,000 tonnes) 
• White hake in Divisons 3NO, TAC of 8,500 tonnes (even though the 
                                                 
114
 NAFO/FC, NAFO Precautionary Approach Framework, Doc. 004/4/18, available: 
<http://archive.nafo.int/open/key-documents/fcdoc04-18.pdf> (retrieved 20 November 2008). 
The Fisheries Commission also agreed to initially test implementation of the Precautionary 
Framework on two stocks (yellowtail flounder in Divisions 3LNO and shrimp in 3M) starting in 
2005. See NAFO, Report of the Fisheries Commission Meeting, 26th Annual Meeting, 
September 13–17, 2004, Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, FC Doc. 04/17. 
115
 The Framework discusses setting fishing mortality limit and buffer reference points, as well 
as stock biomass limit and buffer reference points. 
116
 For example, in the safe zone, managers may choose to establish TACs based on socio-
economic considerations; for the collapse zone, fishing mortality should be set as close to zero 
as possible. 
117
 Amendment, n. 41 above. 
118
 Id. 
119
 See NAFO, Report of Scientific Council Meeting, 7–21 June 2007, SC 7-21, p. 23. 
120
 Id., p. 24. 
121
 Id., pp. 26, 28. 
122
 See Scientific Council Meeting, 1–15 June 2006, SC 1-15, p. 19. 
123
 Id., p. 15. 
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Scientific Council advised such a level was “unrealistic”) 
• Thorny skate in Divisions 3LNO, TAC of 13,500 tonnes (even though 
the Scientific Council advised thorny skate in Divisions 3LNOPs should 
be managed as a unit and the TAC should not exceed 11,000 tonnes)124 
 
At the 30th annual meeting of the Fisheries Commission, further divergencies 
from the following of scientific advice for 2009 stood out. The Fisheries 
Commission TACs for thorny skate, white hake, and redfish in 3M and shrimp 
in Divisions 3LNO were not consistent with scientific advice.125 
Even though Greenland halibut in Subarea 2 and Divisions 3KLMNO has 
been subject to a fifteen year rebuilding plan, the Fisheries Commission has 
also set quotas higher than recommended by the Scientific Council. For 
example, for 2009, the Council recommended a TAC of 10,471 tonnes but the 
Commission adopted a TAC of 16,000 tonnes.126 The quota was set despite the 
Scientific Council’s documentation that catches from Greenland halibut in 
2004–2007 exceeded the rebuilding plan TACs by 27, 22, 27 and 42 percent 
respectively.127 
The preparedness of Contracting Parties to set substantial quotas even 
when scientific information is lacking represents a third practical constraint on 
precautionary, as exemplified by management of the redfish stock in Division 
3O. Even though the Scientific Council acknowledged that stock dynamics and 
recruitment patterns are poorly understood and TAC advice was impossible,128 
the Fisheries Commission established TACs of 20,000 tonnes for 2008 and 
2009.129 
A fourth precautionary pitfall has been the considerable bycatch 
occurring even for the commercial fish stocks subject to moratoria. A 2005 
report estimated especially high bycatch removals for four stocks closed to 
                                                 
124
 NAFO, Meeting Proceedings of the General Council and Fisheries Commission, September 
2007 – August 2008, pp. 82–87. 
125
 NAFO, Report of the Fisheries Commission, Thirtieth Annual Meeting, 22–26 September 
2008, Vigo, Spain, NAFO/FC Doc. 08/22, pp. 4–8 and Annex 7. Inconsistencies were a thorny 
skate TAC of 13,500 tonnes (6,000 tonnes scientific advice), white hake TAC of 8,500 tonnes 
(scientific advice that such a TAC is not sustainable), redfish in 3M TAC of 8,500 tonnes 
(scientific advice that TAC should not to exceed 5,000 tonnes), and shrimp in 3LN TAC of 
30,000 tonnes (25,000 tonnes scientific advice) [hereinafter NAFO Thirtieth Annual Meeting]. 
126
 Id., pp. 4, 8. 
127
 NAFO, Report of the Scientific Council Meeting, 5-19 June 2008, NAFO SCS Doc. 08/19, 
p. 5. 
128
 NAFO, n. 119 above, p. 119. 
129
 NAFO C&E Measures, n. 48 above, Annex I.A, Annual Quota Table; NAFO Thirtieth 
Annual Meeting, n. 125 above, p. 8. 
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directed fishing.130 Bycatch removals, expressed as a percentage of current total 
biomass, were thought to be 70–89 percent for 3NO cod, 15–27 percent for 
3NLO American plaice, close to 30 percent for 2J 3KL witch founder, and 8.6–
18.9 percent for 3NO witch flounder.131 Although bycatch restrictions have 
been imposed for fish stocks under moratoria,132 the efficacy of these 
restrictions remains to be seen. 
 
 
10.4.2.2. NEAFC and the Precautionary Approach 
 
The “New” NEAFC Convention also states that the NEAFC Commission is to 
ensure that Recommendations are based on the best scientific evidence 
available and that the precautionary approach is applied.133 It is not always 
clear, however, to what extent the precautionary approach has been translated in 
NEAFC management measures. The memorandum of understanding between 
NEAFC and OSPAR acknowledges and provides for the development of 
a common understanding of the application of the precautionary approach 
principle.134  
The TAC adopted in 2009 for mackerel was consistent with ICES advice. 
In addition, the Contracting Parties agreed to implement a long-term 
management plan for the mackerel stock in the North East Atlantic for 2010 
and subsequent years, which is consistent with the precautionary approach.135 
The 2009 TAC for Norwegian (Atlanto-Scandian) herring was set at 1,643,000 
tonnes and also consistent with ICES advice. A long-term management plan 
was also agreed to.136  
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 A Rosenberg, M. Mooney-Seus, and C. Ninnes, Bycatch on the High Seas: A Review of the 
Effectiveness of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (Toronto: WWF-Canada, 2005). 
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 Id., p. 131. 
132
 Article 11 of the NAFO’s C&E Measures, n. 48 above, establishes a bycatch retained on 
board limit of 1,250 kg or 5% of the total catch (whichever is greater). If a vessel exceeds the 
5% bycatch in one haul, the vessel must move a minimum of 10 nm from any position of the 
previous tow. If after moving, the next haul still exceeds the bycatch limit, the vessel must 
leave the Division and not return for at least 60 hours. 
133
 ”New” NEAFC Convention, n. 42 above, Article 4 (2) a & b.  
134
 Memorandum of Understanding between the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission 
(NEAFC) and the OSPAR Commission, available: <http://www.neafc.org/about/docs/ 
opsar_mou.pdf> (retrieved 12 December 2008) [hereinafter NEAFC/OSPAR MoU]. 
135
 Agreed Record of Conclusions of fisheries Consultations between the Faroe Islands, 
the European Community, Norway on the management of Mackerel in the North-East Atlantic 
in 2009, available: <http://www.neafc.org/system/files/mackerel_2009_agreedrecord_ 
signed.pdf> (retrieved 20 November 2008)  
136
 Agreed Record of Conclusions of fisheries consultations on the management of the 
Norwegian Spring Spawning (Atlanto-Scandian) Herring Stock in the North-East Atlantic for 
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Implementing the precautionary approach seems especially problematic 
in relation to three fish stocks. For 2009 the TAC for blue whiting was set at 
590,000 tonnes instead of the precautionary limit of 384,000 tonnes 
recommended by ICES.137 For pelagic redfish, no precautionary reference 
points have been set and no consensus on stock structure exists, yet substantial 
fishing continues. ICES considers that the current landings of 64,000 tonnes is 
far above its advice of 20,000 tonnes. ICES advises that a management plan be 
developed and implemented which takes into account the uncertainties in 
science and the properties of the fisheries. Conditions set for directed fishing 
activities for orange roughy, namely restricting catches of any Contracting 
Party to 150 tonnes and ensuring vessels operate with a historical fishing 
record, are deemed precautionary but without a clear rationale.138  
NEAFC was criticised at its 2008 meeting for having a different approach 
to the impact assessments for exploratory and existing fisheries. For new 
fisheries “particular care shall be taken in the evaluation of risks of the 
significant adverse impact on VMEs, in line with the precautionary approach.” 
For existing fisheries a more lax approach seems to be suggested as there is no 
mention of the precautionary approach but instead the notification that 
assessments should take account of the history of bottom fishing in the areas 
proposed.139  
 
 
                                                                                                                                  
2009, available: <http://www.neafc.org/system/files/herring_2009.pdf> (retrieved 20 November 
2008) [hereinafter 2009 agreement on the allocation of herring].  
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 Agreed Record of Conclusions of fisheries consultations between the European Community, 
the Faroe Islands, Norway on the management of blue whiting in the North-East Atlantic in 
2009, available: <http://www.neafc.org/system/files/bluewhiting_2009.pdf> (retrieved 20 Nov-
ember 2008) [hereinafter 2009 agreement on the allocation of blue whiting].  
138
 In ascertaining the “robustness” of the process of multilateral cooperation in North East 
Atlantic fisheries, the NEAFC Performance Report Document, n. 43 above, noted at page 33 
that there were no long-term objectives or plans in place to detect whether the current “30% 
reduction in TAC in relation to the orange roughy is sufficiently precautionary or not.” Even 
though Annex 1 of the NEAFC Performance Report lists the orange roughy as one of the 
species for which NEAFC may request recurring scientific advice from the ICES, there are no 
long-term precautionary plans in place.  
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 NEAFC, NEAFC Recommendation XVI: 2008, Recommendation By The North-East 
Atlantic Fisheries Commission In Accordance With Article 5 Of The Convention On Future 
Multilateral Cooperation In North-East Atlantic Fisheries At Its Extraordinary Meeting On 1-2 
July 2008 To Adopt The Following Recommendation On Bottom Fishing Activities In The 
NEAFC Regulatory Area, available <http://www.neafc.org/system/files/%252Fhome/neafc/ 
drupal2_files/16-rec_bottom_fishing_ em_2008.pdf> (retrieved 20 November 2008).  
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10.4.3. Implementing the Ecosystem Approach 
 
10.4.3.1. NAFO and the Ecosystem Approach 
 
While a considerable focus of NAFO continues to be on single stock 
assessments and establishing TACs and other controls for fish stocks not under 
a moratorium,140 NAFO has been trying to alter its course towards 
an ecosystem approach in multiple ways. Amendments to the NAFO 
Convention in September 2007 committed parties to apply an ecosystem 
approach to fisheries management in the Northwest Atlantic,141 with established 
safeguarding of marine ecosystems as an objective142 and the preservation of 
marine biological diversity as a key principle.143 
Various institutional mechanisms have been forged to advance marine 
ecosystem research and understanding. In the early 1990s, the Scientific 
Council established a Standing Committee on Fisheries Environment 
(STACFEN). STACFEN has published numerous studies on how biological 
resources are influenced by environmental factors, including climate change.144 
The Scientific Council has established a Working Group on Ecosystem 
Approach to Fisheries Management which first met in May 2008 and has been 
tasked with identifying VMEs, furthering research on regional ecosystems in 
the NAFO Convention Area, and developing ecosystem indicators.145 A Joint 
NAFO-ICES Joint Working Group on Deep Water Ecology has been formed to 
increase sharing of information and cooperative research on deep water 
ecosystems. A March 2008 meeting of the Working Group advanced 
understanding of coral species’ distributions throughout the North Atlantic.146 
NAFO has progressed in protecting some vulnerable marine ecosystems. 
In 2006, the Fisheries Commission agreed to close four seamounts to demersal 
fishing gears in the Regulatory Area, namely: Orphan Knoll, Corner 
                                                 
140
 For a good overview of NAFO’s regulatory approaches and constraints, see 
A. A. Rosenberg, R. J. Trumble, J. M. Harrington, O. Martens, and M. Mooney-Seus, High 
Seas Reform: Actions to Reduce Bycatch and Implement Ecosystem-Based Management for the 
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (Toronto: WWF-Canada, 2006). 
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 Amendment, n. 41 above, Preamble. 
142
 Id., Article II. 
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 Id., Article III (e). 
144
 See NAFO Science, “Ecosystem Considerations,” available: <http://www.nafo.int/science/ 
ecosystem_html> (retrieved 23 November 2008). 
145
 See NAFO Working Group on Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries Management, available: 
<http://www.nafo.int/science/ecostem/eawg/wg-ea.html> (retrieved 20 November 2008). 
146
 International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), Report of the ICES-NAFO Joint 
Working Group on Deep Water Ecology (WG DEG), 10–14 March 2008, Copenhagen, 
Denmark, ICES CM 2008/Acom: 45 [hereinafter WGDEG Report]. 
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Seamounts, Newfoundland Seamounts, and New England Seamounts.147 In 
2007, the Commission agreed to establish a Coral Protection Zone, closing all 
fishing activity involving bottom contact gear for a large area of Division 3O 
from 1 January 2008 to 31 December 2012.148 
Further advances towards protecting VMEs were made in 2008. The 
Scientific Council identified on a broad scale basis eight additional candidate 
VMEs,149 and a preliminary map of the bottom trawl fishing “footprint” for 
2003–2007 was produced.150 An Ad Hoc Working Group of Fishing Managers 
and Scientists on VMEs was established to further discussions and 
recommendations for protecting VMEs.151 At its annual meeting in September 
2008, the Fisheries Commission agreed to extend protection from demersal 
fishing gears to the Fogo Seamounts as of 1 January 2009, and to adopt an 
Interim Exploratory Fishery Protocol and an Interim VME Encounter 
Protocol.152 
Even though NAFO has been taking numerous steps towards 
an ecosystem approach with its various governance implications,153 the 
reformatory swim is far from over with four challenging issues becoming 
apparent. These challenges include fully fleshing out and ensuring VME 
protection, casting the management net to cover a broader range of species, 
bolstering the conservation of sharks and sea turtles, and furthering marine 
ecosystem research.154  
                                                 
147
 NAFO, Report of the Fisheries Commission, 28th Annual Meeting, 18–22 September 2006, 
Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, Canada, NAFO/FC Doc. 06/14 at 9. Pursuant to Article 14(5) of 
NAFO’s E&C Measures, n. 48 above, the closure is to be effective from 1 January 2007 until 
31 December 2010. 
148
 NAFO, Report of the Fisheries Commission, 29th Annual Meeting, 24 September 2007, 
Lisbon, Portugal. NAFO FC Doc. 07/24 at 11 [hereinafter NAFO Twenty-ninth Annual 
Meeting]. The Protection Zone has been given force through Article 15 of NAFO E&C 
Measures. These measures will be discussed later in this study.  
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 Report of the Scientific Council Meeting, 5–19 June 2008, NAFO SCS Doc. 08/19, pp. 38–
41. 
150
 Id., p. 34. 
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 See Report of the AD Hoc Working Group of Fishing Managers and Scientists on 
Vulnerable Marine Ecosystems (WG FMS), 8–12 September 2008, Montreal, Canada, 
NAFO/FC Doc. 08/8. 
152
 NAFO Thirtieth Annual Meeting, n. 125 above, p. 44. 
153
 For a summary of the vast array of measures flowing from the ecosystems approach, see 
S. M. Garcia, A. Zerbi, C. Aliaume, T. Do Chi, and G. Lasserre, “The Ecosystem Approach to 
Fisheries: Issues, Terminology, Principles, Institutional Foundations, Implementation and 
Outlook,” FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No. 443 (Rome: FAO, 2003). 
154
 These four central challenges, of course, are not the only limitations in achieving 
implementation of the ecosystem approach. Other challenges include, lack of compliance with 
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Fully Fleshing Out and Ensuring VME Protection under NAFO 
 
Further designation and protection of VMEs in the NAFO Conservation Area 
remains a central challenge for further implementation of the ecosystem 
approach. At the September 2008 meeting of the Fisheries Commission, the 
Commission considered eight potential VME candidates but decided for most 
sites additional high level habitat mapping would be required to identify VME 
boundaries with greater certainty.155 The Commission requested the Scientific 
Council to refine its information on coral concentrations as soon as possible in 
2008 so as to provide information on sponge concentrations by 30 June 2009 
and to provide information on corals and sponges in canyons as soon as 
practicable or at least provide a progress report by 30 June 2009.156 Only the 
Fogo Seamounts were added to the closed area list. Whether Canada and 
Greenland should move to protect VMEs in the Baffin Bay/Davis Strait region 
remains to be seen.157 
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) at the September 2008 meeting 
were quick to criticise the lack of agreement protecting all the candidate VME 
areas. The EU, in particular, was accused of backtracking on deep-sea 
protection.158 The failure to fully implement the 2006 UN General Assembly 
Resolution on Sustainable Fisheries was lamented, specifically the need to 
implement protective measures for identified VMEs by 31 December 2008.159 
NGOs expressed serious concern over the apparent view of some NAFO 
Contracting Parties that historically fished areas should not be closed as 
ecosystem damage had already occurred.160 
The Exploratory Protocol for New Fishing Areas, agreed to by the 
Fisheries Commission in September 2008, also addressed VMEs, but its 
effectiveness in practice remains to be seen. The Protocol requires Contracting 
Parties to submit harvesting, mitigation, catch monitoring, and data collection 
plans to the Executive Secretary before allowing bottom fishing activities in 
new areas to commence. A mitigation plan must include measures to prevent 
significant adverse impact to VMEs that may be encountered. A catch 
                                                                                                                                  
management measures, fisheries on juveniles, and illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) 
fishing. See Rosenberg et al., n. 130 above. 
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 NAFO Thirtieth Annual Meeting, n. 125 above, p. 6. 
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 Id., pp. 9–10 and Annex 13. 
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 See The Deep Sea Conservation Coalition, European Union Backtracks on Deep-Sea 
Protection (10 October 2008), available: <http://www.save_the_highseas.org/display.cfm 
?ID=179> (retrieved 20 November 2008). 
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 Id. 
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monitoring plan must include recording/reporting of all species caught, 100 
percent satellite tracking, and 100 percent observer coverage, and a data 
collection plan is required for identifying VMEs/species. No prior impact 
assessment process exits, but the Executive Secretary is required to forward the 
planning information to all Contracting Parties and the Scientific Council. 
Exploratory fishing trip reports must be submitted by parties to the NAFO 
Scientific Council.  
The adequacy of the Encounter Protocol in protecting VMEs is also 
questionable. The Protocol will require fishing vessels encountering indicator 
species of corals and sponges to “move away” at least two nm if a catch per set 
brings up more than 100 kg of live coral and/or 1,000 kg of live sponges.161 
Such high catch thresholds have been criticised,162 but the Protocol notes the 
provisional basis of these thresholds and the possibility for adjustment in light 
of recent experience.163 
 
 
Casting the Management Net to Cover a Broader Range of Species 
 
A further ecosystems approach challenge is to extend protective management 
measures to a broader range of species, especially marine species at risk. NAFO 
currently manages only 11 of some 25 commercial species.164 
The existing shortcoming is exemplified by the spotted wolffish and 
northern wolffish stocks. While Canada has listed these two species as 
threatened under its Species at Risk Act165 and has required within the EEZ 
allowable harm permits for takings and live releases if possible,166 the two 
wolffish species remain unprotected in the NAFO Regulatory Area outside 
Canadian fisheries jurisdiction. 
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 NAFO Thirtieth Annual Meeting, n. 125 above, Annex 13.4, para. 3. 
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 See Deep Sea Conservation Coalition, n. 158 above. 
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 NAFO Thirtieth Annual Meeting, n. 125 above, Annex 13.4, para. 3. 
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 NAFO, “NAFO Fishery,” available: <http://www.hafo.int/fisheries/fishery-.html> (retrieved 
20 November 2008).  
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 Species at Risk Act, S.C. 2002, c. 29.  
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 See D. L. VanderZwaag, and J. Hutchings, “Canada’s Marine Species at Risk: Law and 
Science at the Helm, but a Sea of Uncertainties,” Ocean Development & International Law 36 
(2005): 219–259, p. 229. Also see D. Kulka, C. Hood and J. Huntington, “Recovery Strategy 
for Northern Wolffish (Anarhichas denticulatus) and Spotted Wolffish (Anarhichas minor), and 
Management Plan for Atlantic Wolffish (Anarhichas lupus) in Canada” (St. John’s: DFO 
Newfoundland and Labrador Region, 2007), pp. 70–71. Following publication of the recovery 
strategy, conservation conditions have been included within fisheries licenses. David Millar, 
Regional Manager, Species at Risk, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, pers. comm. (23 April 2009). 
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Bolstering the Conservation of Sharks and Sea Turtles 
 
The management of sharks and sea turtles, two relatively high profile marine 
species, might be described as rather secondary to the NAFO agenda. NAFO’s 
C&E Measures devotes just one article (Article 16) to the conservation of 
sharks with four main commitments: Parties are required to report data for all 
catches of sharks167; Parties are required to impose a shark finning ban whereby 
their vessels must not have onboard shark fins totalling more than 5 percent of 
the weight of sharks onboard up to the first point of landing168; Parties are 
urged to encourage the live release of sharks caught in non-directed fisheries169; 
and Parties are also encouraged to undertake research into non-selective fishing 
gears and the identification of shark nursery areas.170 
The conservation of sea turtles is addressed through a 2006 resolution of 
the Fisheries Commission aimed at reducing sea turtle mortality in NAFO 
fishing operations.171 The resolution urges Parties to enhance the 
implementation of existing turtle mitigation measures and to provide sea turtle 
catch and release data to the NAFO Secretariat.172 
Various management challenges surround the future management of 
shark and sea turtles. For sharks, those challenges include ensuring catch data is 
fully reported, revisiting whether the 5 percent weight of shark fins onboard is 
a workable conservation measure, and determining whether shark bycatch or 
other fishing requirements should be imposed.173 For turtles, the adequacy of 
reporting on fisheries interactions with sea turtles in the NAFO Convention 
Area needs to be assessed,174 and the question of whether catch mitigation 
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 NAFO C&E Measures, n. 48 above, Article 16(1). 
168
 Id., Article 16(3). 
169
 Id., Article 16(6). 
170
 Id., Article 16(7)(8). 
171
 Resolution of the Fisheries Commission of NAFO to Reduce Sea Turtle Mortality in NAFO 
Fishing Operations (22 September 2006) 1/06, available: <http://www.nafo.int/publications/ 
resolutions/res1-06.html> (retrieved 20 November 2008). 
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 Id., paras 2 and 5. 
173
 It should be noted that at the September 2007 Fisheries Commission meeting, the United 
States proposed a prohibition on possessing porbeagle sharks in the Regulatory Area, but no 
consensus was reached and the proposal was withdrawn. NAFO Twenty-ninth Annual Meeting, 
n. 148 above, s. 8.14. The bycatch of porbeagle sharks in pelagic longline fisheries has been a 
concern. The NAFO President was requested in September 2008 to write to ICCAT, urging 
ICCAT to take necessary conservation measures to protect the porbeagle stock. NAFO Thirtieth 
Annual Meeting, n. 125 above, s. 10. 
174
 Reporting appears to be quite limited, with Canada, Denmark and Portugal providing 
updates on sea turtle-fisheries interactions and the United States submitting an update on its 
Northwest Fisheries Observer Program, Sea Turtle Training Module. NAFO Secretariat, Update 
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measures should become mandatory remains to be discussed. 
 
 
Furthering Marine Ecosystem Research 
 
While NAFO is transitioning towards an ecosystem approach, building 
scientific information and understanding of marine ecosystems is a great 
challenge. The relative paucity of scientific information was highlighted by the 
Working Group on Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries Management in its May 
2008 Meeting. The report acknowledged that very little is known about deep-
water benthic communities, seamount fish communities and marine mammal 
distributions in the NAFO Regulatory Area.175 The need to increase data 
collection and mapping of sponge habitats was emphasised,176 as was the need 
for more data on non-commercial species.177 The report also noted the ecology 
of canyons in the NAFO Regulatory Area is not well documented.178 
The Fisheries Commission has highlighted the need for more information 
on the role of seals in the marine ecosystem of the Northwest Atlantic. The 
Commission has requested the Scientific Council to provide an overview of 
present knowledge, including the impact of seals on fish stocks, at the 
Commission’s next annual meeting in 2009.179 At the September 2008 Meeting 
of the Commission, the EU announced it would start implementing a research 
programme in the summer of 2009 on mapping the seabeds. The EU welcomed 
the cooperation of other Parties in such an endeavour.180 
 
 
10.4.3.2. NEAFC and the Ecosystem Approach 
 
NEAFC not only focuses on conserving and managing target species, but also 
envisages to minimise bycatch of fish and non-fish species and other impacts 
on the broader marine environment. At its 2003 meeting, NEAFC reviewed 
recent trends in the international management of marine resources, including 
                                                                                                                                  
on Sea Turtle-Fisheries Interactions, NAFO Thirtieth Annual Meeting, n. 125 above, pp. 6–7, 
20, September 2008, FC Working Paper 08/24 and FC Working Paper 08/24 (Addendum). 
175
 NAFO, Report of the NAFO Scientific Council Working Group on Ecosystem Approach to 
Fisheries Management (WGEAFM), Scientific Council Meeting – June 2008, NAFO SCS Doc. 
08/10, pp. 6-7, 20. 
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 Id., p. 16. 
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 Id., p. 37. 
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 Id., p. 41. 
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 NAFO Thirtieth Annual Meeting, n. 125 above, p. 10 and Annex 5, item 14.  
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 Id., p. 9. 
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the ecosystem approach. In 2005, the Working Group on the Future of NEAFC 
examined how to strengthen NEAFC’s role in addressing overall ocean 
management. The ecosystem approach is now a permanent agenda item at 
annual meetings. The "new" NEAFC Convention reflects the ecosystem 
approach by stating that the Commission when making recommendations in 
accordance with Article 4 or 6 of the Convention, shall in particular: 
NEAFC 
take due account of the impact of fisheries on other species and marine 
ecosystems, and in doing so adopt, where necessary, conservation and 
management measures that address the need to minimise harmful 
impacts on living marine resources and marine ecosystems; . . . 
take due account of the need to conserve marine biological diversity.181 
 
In addition, it is provided that:  
 
The Commission shall provide a forum for consultation and exchange of 
information on the state of the fishery resources in the Convention Area 
and on the management policies, including examination of the overall 
effects of such policies on the fishery resources and, as appropriate, 
other living marine resources and marine ecosystems.182 
 
NEAFC has made some progress in protecting deep-sea species and 
habitats from the effects of trawl fishing. An area adjacent to Rockall Bank was 
first closed to trawl fishing in 2001. In 2002, NEAFC set a limit on the catch of 
many, though not all, deep-water species taken in bottom trawl fisheries on the 
high seas of the NEAFC area. The limit, however, specified that the fishing 
effort was not to exceed the “highest level put into deep-sea fishing in previous 
years” despite ICES’ advice that most deep-water fish species are exploited 
well beyond safe biological limits in the region. In 2003, the NEAFC 
Commission reviewed scientific information from ICES concerning deep-sea 
species. From March 2004, a temporary freeze on efforts in deep-sea fisheries 
was introduced for the rest of the year in the NEAFC Regulatory Area.183 
A 30 percent reduction in deep-sea fisheries effort was agreed for 2005 
onwards following ICES advice. At its 26th annual meeting in November 2007, 
NEAFC adopted management measures limiting for each Contracting Party the 
                                                 
181
 “New” NEAFC Convention, n. 42 above, Article 4(2)(c-d). 
182
 Id., Article 4(3). 
183
 C. M. Johnston, Scoping Study: Protection of vulnerable high seas and deep oceans 
biodiversity and associated oceans governance (Peterborough: Joint Nature Conservation 
Committee, 2004). 
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effort for 2007 for directed fishing of deep-sea species. The effort could not 
exceed 65 percent of the highest level put into deep-sea fishing in previous 
years for the relevant species. This measure entered into force on 16 February 
2008.184 
In July 2008, NEAFC recommended mapping existing bottom fishing 
areas within the Regulatory Area for bottom fishing activities.185 Contracting 
Parties were required to submit relevant information. The deadline was 
1 September 2008, but only the Russian Federation and Iceland had submitted 
such information. From 1 January 2009, all bottom fishing activities in new 
bottom fishing areas, or with bottom gear not previously used in the area 
concerned, will be considered as exploratory fisheries and shall be conducted in 
accordance with an exploratory bottom fisheries protocol. Exploratory bottom 
fishing activities are to be subjected to an assessment procedure, with the 
understanding that particular care will be taken in the evaluation of risks of the 
significant adverse impact on VMEs, in line with the precautionary approach. 
New bottom fishing activities will be based upon the results of exploratory 
bottom fisheries. It will be the task of NEAFC to authorise bottom fishing and 
to establish conservation and management measures to prevent significant 
adverse impacts on VMEs. Contracting Parties and vessels flying their flag will 
be required to cease bottom fishing activities where, in the course of fishing 
operations, evidence of VMEs is encountered. The encounter, including the 
location and the type of ecosystem in question, must be reported to NEAFC so 
that appropriate measures can be adopted.186 This proposal was based on 
a Norwegian proposal, which, to a large extent, is based on a proposal by 
Canada and the EU in NAFO.  
NEAFC has only recently made progress in imposing restrictions on the 
impact of deep-water trawling in the North East Atlantic on seamounts, 
coldwater corals, and sensitive bottom ecosystems in the region. Consequently, 
destructive deep-sea bottom trawl fisheries could continue to expand in the 
North East Atlantic.  
Five vulnerable habitats were closed to demersal fishing gear for 2005–
2007 and in November 2006, NEAFC closed parts of the Hatton and Rockall 
Banks, the Logachev Mounds and the West-Rockall Mounds to fishing from 
January 2007–December 2009. These and additional areas had been proposed 
by the EC in 2005 based on recommendations from ICES. These closures, 
                                                 
184
 North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC), NEAFC Recommendation XV: 2008, 
available: <http://www.neafc.org/measures/current_measures/docs/15-rec_deepsea_species 
_2008.pdf> (retrieved 20 November 2008). 
185
 NEAFC, Extraordinary Meeting in London on 1–3 July 2008.  
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 NEAFC Recommendation XVI, n. 139 above. 
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while being a positive step forward for offshore marine conservation, were 
viewed by NGOs as exemplifying the short-term fishing interests of some of 
the Convention’s parties soon after they were designated. NEAFC 
Recommendation VII recommended that with respect to certain vulnerable 
deep-sea habitats, bottom trawling and fishing with static gear was to be 
prohibited in the following areas: a) the Hecate and Faraday seamounts and 
a section of the Reykjanes Ridge; b) the Altair seamounts; and c) the Antialtair 
seamounts. These measures apply for the period 1 January 2008–31 December 
2008.187 Recommendation IX, also resulting from the 26th annual meeting held 
in November 2007, entailed measures to close certain areas to protect deep-
water coral reefs.188  
At its 2003 meeting, NEAFC also reviewed recent trends in the 
international management of marine resources, including cooperation with 
other regional and global organisations. NEAFC works closely with other 
RFMOs in the North Atlantic, namely NAFO189 and the International Baltic Sea 
Fishery Commission (IBSFC), as well as ICES. The NEAFC Secretariat 
initiated the North Atlantic Regional Fisheries Management Organization 
(NARFMO) and has organised annual meetings since 2001.  
NEAFC and the OSPAR Commission (in charge of the Convention for 
the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic) have 
delivered a breakthrough initiative by announcing plans to promote mutual 
cooperation towards the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity 
in the North East Atlantic. For the first time in the North East Atlantic, the 
Commissions in charge of fisheries management and protection of the marine 
environment are working together. Previously they could have been seen as 
working towards diverse goals but now a converging vision of a healthier North 
East Atlantic has encouraged them to sign a memorandum of understanding 
(MOU), in which both have agreed to cooperate towards the protection of 
marine ecosystems. The MOU, which has applied since September 2008, 
covers not only national maritime areas, but also areas beyond national 
jurisdiction.190 
 
 
                                                 
187
 NEAFC, Recommendation VII, available: <http://www.neafc.org/measures/index.html> 
(retrieved 20 November 2008). 
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 NEAFC, Recommendation IX: 2008, available: <http://www.neafc.org/measures/ 
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10.4.4. Reaching Consensus on Allocation Criteria 
 
10.4.4.1. NAFO and Allocation Criteria 
 
The NAFO Convention provides very general and limited guidance regarding 
allocation of fishing opportunities in the Regulatory Area that relates to 
adjusting current fisheries, reopening closed fisheries, opening new fisheries, 
and ensuring new members receive an appropriate share. Article XI(4) of the 
Convention essentially calls for a balancing between the interests of Parties 
exercising traditional fishing and coastal state interests:  
 
Proposals adopted by the Commission for the allocation of catches in the 
Regulatory Area shall take into account the interests of Commission 
members whose vessels have traditionally fished within that Area, and, in 
the allocation of catches from the Grand Bank and Flemish Cap, 
Commission members shall give special consideration to the Contracting 
Party whose coastal communities are primarily dependent on fishing for 
stocks related to these fishing banks and which has undertaken extensive 
efforts to ensure the conservation of such stocks through international 
action, in particular, by providing surveillance and inspection of 
international fisheries on these banks under an international scheme of 
joint enforcement.191 
 
A Working Group on the Allocation of Fishing Rights, formed in 1997, 
held a number of meetings culminating in a meeting in March 2003 at Miami, 
Florida, where consensus could not be reached on allocation criteria.192 Four 
key criteria emerged from the discussions, albeit not formally endorsed. They 
include: 
 
• historical fishing in accordance with NAFO rules during a representative 
reference period; 
• contribution to research and data collection on the stock concerned; 
                                                 
191
 The NAFO Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic 
Fisheries, 24 October 1978, U.N.T S., 1135, 370-388, entry into force 1 January 1979, full text 
available: <http://www.nafo.int/about/overview/convention/convention.pdf> (retrieved 20 Nov-
ember 2008) [hereinafter NAFO Convention]. 
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 NAFO, Report of the Working Group on the Allocation of Fishing Rights to the Contracting 
Parties of NAFO, March 26–27, 2003, Miami, Florida, U.S.A., NAFO/FC Doc. 03/02, full text 
available: <http://archive.nafo.int/open/mp/2003-04/fc_allocation-mar.pdf> (retrieved 20 Nov-
ember 2008). 
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• needs of coastal communities that are dependent on fishing for the stock 
concerned; and/or 
• contribution to the NAFO conservation and enforcement measures.193 
 
The challenge of fisheries allocation is especially apparent in relation to shrimp. 
For shrimp in Division 3M, NAFO parties have not been able to agree on 
a quota allocation scheme due to differing opinions on the extent to which 
historical fisheries should influence a quota allocation and which reference 
period should be used.194 As a result, a rather unsatisfactory scheme continues 
whereby Contracting Parties are allocated a certain number of fishing days by 
a specific number of vessels (see Table 10.1).195 
 
Table 10.1. Effort allocation scheme for shrimp fishery in the NAFO 
Regulatory Area Divison 3M (2008) 
 
Contracting Party Number of Fishing Days Number of Vessels 
Canada  456 16 
Cuba  100 1 
Denmark 
– Faroe Islands 
– Greenland 
 
1,606 
515 
 
8 
14 
European Union  3,2931 331 
France (in respect of St. Pierre 
et Miquelon)  100 1 
Iceland  N/A N/A 
Japan  100 1 
Korea  100 1 
Norway  1,985 32 
Russia  2,100 N/A 
Ukraine  100 1 
USA  100 1 
1 This includes fishing entitlements transferred from Poland (100 fishing days with one vessel), 
Estonia (1,667 fishing days with eight vessels), Latvia (490 fishing days with four vessels) and 
Lithuania (579 fishing days with seven vessels) following their accession to the EU. 
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Iceland has consistently objected to the effort allocation scheme as it 
could lead to overfishing.196 Allocation of shrimp in Division 3L continues to 
be controversial. Objectors such as Denmark, in respect of the Faroe Islands 
and Greenland since 2002,197 have questioned the allocation scheme for the 
shrimp, which has been rolled over since 1999 without consensus on the basis 
for division of shares.198 
 
 
10.4.4.2. NEAFC and Allocation Criteria 
 
NEAFC uses a wide range of methods to allocate fishing opportunities, 
particularly by means of TACs and national quotas.199 NEAFC’s focal species 
are redfish, mackerel, herring, haddock, blue whiting and deep-sea species.200 
The Contracting Parties to the Convention have, in many instances, been unable 
to take the necessary steps to effectively implement the Convention due to the 
lack of agreed allocation arrangements in many key fisheries.201 Prior to 2006, 
no agreement was reached on the allocation of blue whiting.202 Lack of 
consensus on stock structure led to the absence of management measures for 
oceanic redfish in 2005. Agreement on the sharing out of Atlanto-Scandian 
herring had to wait until 2008.203 Recently, Greenland expressed its great 
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 NAFO, n. 47 above, pp. 4–5. 
197 Objections Lodged by Contracting Parties (1994–2007). Copy provided to the authors by the 
NAFO Secretariat. 
198 NAFO, n. 47 above, pp. 5–6. 
199
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201
 Decisions are made by simple majority or, where the Convention requires a qualified 
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Convention), Contracting Parties are required to provide a written statement identifying the 
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measures. Management of all stocks is discussed in the plenary meeting. 
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 Recommendation adopted by postal vote on blue whiting by Denmark in respect of the Faroe 
Islands and Greenland, the EC, Iceland, and Norway. 
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 Recommendation from the 26th Annual Meeting November 2007, Recommendation by the 
North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission in Accordance with Article 5 of the Convention on 
Future Multilateral Cooperation in North East Atlantic Fisheries at its annual Meeting in 
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disappointment for not having been allocated a share of the Atlanto-Scandian 
herring stock for 2009. Greenland believes it should be entitled to a share of 
this stock. It finds support in Article 7 of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, which 
states that the track record in the relevant fisheries should be taken into account 
when allocating fishing opportunities from straddling stocks. Greenlandic 
vessels have conducted fisheries for the stock in the years since its recovery 
when no international management has been in place.204  
 
2009 allocation of blue whiting205  
 
European Community 
Faroe Islands  
Iceland  
Norway 
165,628 tonnes 
141,870 tonnes 
95,739 tonnes 
139,806 tonnes 
 
2009 allocation of herring206  
 
European Community 
Faroe Islands 
Iceland 
Norway 
Russian Federation 
106,959 tonnes 
84,797 tonnes 
238,399 tonnes 
1,002,230 tonnes 
210,633 tonnes 
 
A recommendation to guide the expectations of new members to NEAFC 
was discussed during the May 2003 meeting of the NEAFC Working Group on 
the Future of NEAFC.207 It was agreed that stocks regulated by NEAFC are 
fully allocated, and fishing opportunities for new Members are likely to be 
limited to new fisheries. New Contracting Parties will participate on same basis 
as existing Contracting Parties in future allocation of stocks unregulated at the 
time of application. In addition, new Contracting Parties that were previously 
Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties may request part of the relevant 
                                                                                                                                  
November 2007 to adopt conservation and management measures for the Norwegian Spring-
spawning (Atlanto-Scandian) Herring in the NEAFC Regulatory Area in 2008.  
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cooperative quota. Such allocations will be considered on case-by-case basis.208 
Reaching agreements on TACs and management measures is a major 
challenge to NEAFC because allocations for the NEAFC Regulatory Area are 
adopted by NEAFC only if there is coastal state agreement regarding allocation 
amongst the coastal states. The successful resolution of allocation issues, which 
is crucial for successful management, requires moving away from the ad hoc 
negotiations amongst coastal states towards management systems driven by 
transparent objectives and implementation processes.209  
Another challenge is that of clarifying ICES advice on stock status for 
mackerel and redfish.210 Information collected and advice provided by ICES is 
utilised differently for different fisheries that are regulated under the 
Convention. In the case of pelagic stocks, the information is utilised in the first 
instance by coastal states in order to reach agreements on TACs and allocations 
within the Convention and Regulatory Areas. Though not involved in this 
initial process, NEAFC in following agreed allocations, will then take steps to 
develop and implement management measures to support these decisions. 
However, a different process is followed for pelagic redfish and deep-sea 
species whereby the TACs and allocations are set directly by NEAFC and may, 
or may not, be endorsed by coastal states.211  
 
 
10.4.5. Ensuring Effective Compliance and Enforcement 
 
In order to facilitate the comparison of the compliance and enforcement 
provisions of the NAFO and NEAFC systems, a similar structure will be 
adhered to when analysing each RFMO. An introductory section describes the 
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 NEAFC, Guidelines for the expectation of future new Contracting Parties with regard to 
fishing opportunities in the NEAFC Regulatory Area (November 2003), available: 
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structure, membership, and objectives of each RFMO and is followed by 
an analysis of reporting and verification provisions. The inspection, boarding 
and observer schemes, as well as other enforcement mechanisms, are 
subsequently addressed. This is followed by a section highlighting the strengths 
and weaknesses of each system. Finally, a brief review of how each RFMO 
implements the 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement212 and the 1995 UN Fish 
Stocks Agreement213 is undertaken.214 This section concludes by indicating the 
ways in which NAFO and NEAFC have recently intensified their cooperation 
efforts aiming to arrive at a more effective compliance and enforcement system. 
 
 
10.4.5.1. The Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization 
 
Structure, Membership and Objectives 
 
NAFO consists of the General Council, the Scientific Council, the Fisheries 
Commission, and the Secretariat situated in Canada.215 NAFO has the following 
membership: Canada, Cuba, Denmark (in respect of Faeroe Islands and 
Greenland), the EC, France (in respect of St. Pierre and Miquelon), Iceland, 
Japan, Korea (Republic of), Norway, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the 
United States.216 The organisation has no provisions on Cooperating Non-
Contracting Parties.217 
The Contracting Parties agreed to maintain in force and to implement 
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 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement, n. 97 above. 
213
 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement, n. 37 above. 
214
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effectiveness of NAFO regulation. See also n. 272 below. 
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within the Regulatory Area a scheme of joint international enforcement.218 This 
scheme includes provisions for reciprocal rights of boarding and inspection by 
the Contracting Parties and for flag state prosecution and sanctions on the basis 
of evidence resulting from such boarding and inspection.219 
 
 
Reporting and Verification 
 
Reporting and verification is undertaken by three primary methods: catch 
reporting, vessel register, and reporting of each offloading for transhipment of 
fish. A Contracting Party must ensure that each vessel of that party with fish on 
board, on entering the Regulatory Area, has a record in its fishing logbook of 
the amount of each species of fish on board.220 Moreover, as regards fish taken 
subject to Fisheries Commission measures, a Contracting Party must guarantee 
that all vessels of that party fishing in the Regulatory Area record their catches 
and the estimated cumulative catch on a daily basis and that the records must 
correspond to the smallest geographical area for which a quota has been 
allocated.221 This will show the disposition of the catch, including any fish 
off-loaded while the vessel is operating in the Regulatory Area, as well as catch 
retained aboard the vessel for the duration of at least twelve months.222  
For all fish taken subject to Fisheries Commission measures, Contracting 
Parties are requested to ensure that all vessels of that party fishing in the 
Regulatory Area either record their cumulative production by species and 
product form in a production logbook, or stow in the hold all processed catch in 
such a way that each species is stowed separately.223 A stowage plan has to be 
maintained showing the location of the products in the hold. Furthermore, the 
Contracting Party, within thirty days following the calendar month in which the 
catches were made, has the duty to report provisional monthly catches by 
species and stock area to the Executive Secretary,224 whether or not that party 
has quota allocations for the stocks from which catches were obtained.225 
The Executive Secretary, within ten days following the monthly deadlines for 
receipt of the provisional catch statistics, collates the information received and 
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circulates it to Contracting Parties.226 
It is the responsibility of the Executive Secretary to establish and 
maintain a register of all vessels of more than fifty gross tons that are 
authorised to fish in the Regulatory Area.227 Each flag Contracting Party has to 
notify the Executive Secretary of all vessels of more than fifty gross tons 
engaged in fishing or in processing fish in the Regulatory Area.228 The format 
for the register of vessels requires twenty different entries and is made in 
electronic form.229 The Executive Secretary makes this register available to all 
Contracting Parties in a systematic fashion and in accordance with applicable 
confidentiality requirements. 
When the transhipment of fish takes place while the vessel is operating in 
the Regulatory Area, a report has to be made at least 24 hours in advance. 
The report should include the date, the time, the geographical position of the 
vessel, and total round weight by species to be transhipped in kilograms.230 
The verification of the reports, as will be seen, is a competence of the 
observers. 
 
 
Inspection and Boarding Schemes 
 
In order to improve and maintain compliance with the conservation and 
enforcement measures for their vessels fishing in the Regulatory Area, 
Contracting Parties acquiesce to a scheme of 100 percent observer coverage and 
to oblige all vessels fishing in the Regulatory Area to be equipped with satellite 
tracking devices.231 Each Contracting Party has the primary responsibility to 
obtain, for placement on its vessels, independent and impartial observers 
performing only the duties explicitly provided for in the C&E Measures.232 
Their salaries are normally covered by the sending Contracting Party. 
Moreover, each Contracting Party has to provide to the Executive Secretary a 
list of the observers they will be placing on vessels in the Regulatory Area.233 
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Observers monitor the vessels’ compliance with the relevant conservation 
and enforcement measures.234 Their duties are as follows: 
 
1. To record and report upon the fishing activities of the vessel and verify 
the position of the vessel when engaged in fishing. The observer 
monitors the functioning of, and reports upon any interference with, the 
satellite system. In order to better distinguish fishing operations from 
steaming and to contribute to an a posteriori calibration of the signals 
registered by the receiving station, the observer maintains detailed 
reports on the daily activity of the vessel 
2. To observe and estimate catches with a view to identifying catch 
composition and monitoring discards, by-catches and the taking of 
undersized fish 
3. To record the gear type, mesh size and attachments employed by the 
master 
4. To verify entries made to the logbooks 
5. To collect catch and effort data on each haul 
6. To carry out the scientific work as requested by the Fisheries 
Commission235 
 
The vessel on which an observer is placed has to provide suitable food 
and lodging during the observer’s deployment. Vessel masters have to ensure 
that all necessary cooperation is extended to observers in order for them to 
carry out their duties including providing access, as required, to the retained 
catch, and catch which is intended to be discarded.236 
The use of arms in relation to the inspections is prohibited and, in 
particular, the inspectors are requested not to carry arms. The principle of not 
carrying or using arms shall not be deemed to limit the performance of 
inspections by a Contracting Party of vessels flying its own flag.237 
A serious infringement is considered to have occurred where a NAFO 
inspector finds an apparent infringement of the following prohibitions: 
 
1. Fishing on an “Others” quota without prior notification to the Executive 
Secretary, or more than seven working days after the Contracting Party 
for the inspected vessel has been notified by the Executive Secretary 
                                                 
234
 In this case, the NAFO C&E Measures with amendments as adopted at the Fisheries 
Commission’s Inter-Sessional Meeting (see n. 47 above) in May 2008. 
235
 NAFO C&E Measures, n. 48 above, Article 27(4).  
236
 Id. 
237
 Id., Article 28(8). 
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that fishing under an “Others” quota for that stock or species was closed 
2. Directed fishing for a stock which is subject to a moratorium or for 
which fishing is prohibited 
3. Directed fishing for stocks or species after the date on which the 
Contracting Party for the inspected vessel has notified the Executive 
Secretary that vessels of that party will cease a directed fishery for those 
stocks or species 
4. Fishing in a closed area or with gear prohibited in a specific area 
5. Mesh size violations 
6. Fishing without a valid authorisation issued by the flag Contracting 
Party 
7. Mis-recording of catches 
8. Interference with the satellite tracking system 
9. Catch communication violations 
10. Preventing an inspector or an observer from carrying out his or her 
duties 
 
The inspector must attempt to communicate with an inspector of the 
Contracting Party for the inspected vessel.238 The master of the inspected vessel 
has the duty to provide the use of the vessel’s radio equipment and operator for 
messages to be sent out and received for this purpose.239 The inspector also 
immediately reports to the Executive Secretary. 
Whilst awaiting the arrival of the inspector of the Contracting Party for 
the inspected vessel, the inspector may require the master to cease all fishing 
which appears to the inspector to contravene the measures referred to above. 
The inspector may also seal the vessel’s hold awaiting port inspection.240 In 
2006, an enhanced follow-up with regard to certain serious infringements 
(namely points 2 and 7 above) was elaborated whereby the flag state may be 
required to order the vessel to proceed immediately to a port in order to be 
inspected.241 
When a port call is made in the port of a Contracting Party by a vessel 
that has been engaged in fishing for stocks subject to conservation measures, 
the Contracting Party whose port is being used has to ensure that its inspector is 
                                                 
238
 Id., Article 36(2). 
239
 Id. 
240
 Id., Article 36(6). 
241
 Id., Article 36(7). Article 36(7) explains that this is only applicable where justified, and the 
inspection must be made by the contracting flag state vessel’s inspector in the presence of 
another Contracting Party’s inspector. Where the vessel’s home port is a long way away, the 
Article lists ports in the Regulatory Area where the vessel will be inspected by authorised 
officials. 
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present and that, on each occasion when catch is offloaded, an inspection takes 
place to verify the species and quantities caught.242 The Contracting Party is to 
ensure that the interference in the offloading activity is minimised and that the 
quality of the catch is not adversely affected.243 The quantities landed by 
species and the quantities retained on board, if any, are to be cross-checked 
with the quantities recorded in logbooks, catch reports on exit from the 
Regulatory Area, and reports of any inspections carried out under this 
scheme.244 Additionally, inspections have to include verification of mesh size 
of nets on board and size of fish retained on board.245 
 
 
Other Enforcement Provisions/Schemes 
 
NAFO has adopted a wide range of measures for the conservation and 
management of the stocks in the Regulatory Area. These include setting total 
allowable catches and member nation quota allocations,246 technical 
conservation measures such as minimum fish sizes,247 minimum mesh sizes,248 
and changing gear requirements.249 Fishing vessels have to record their catches 
on a daily basis and record their cumulative production by species in 
a production logbook. 
Where a NAFO inspector cites a vessel for having committed an apparent 
infringement of reporting and gear requirements, the inspector will immediately 
report this to the Executive Secretary. The Executive Secretary in turn 
immediately has the duty to ensure, for information purposes, that an inspection 
                                                 
242
 Id., Article 44(1). 
243
 Id. Chapter IV, Article 28(9), in stating the general provisions for inspection and 
surveillance, notes that quality of catch is maintained by avoiding any damage to packaging, 
wrapping, or other containers. Where cartons and other containers are opened as part of the 
inspection process, they must be opened in such a way as to facilitate prompt resealing, 
repacking, and eventual re-storage. 
244
 Id., Article 44(3). In addition, inspections must be carried out in accordance with Chapter IV 
provisions on inspections and surveillance. 
245
 Id., Article 44(4). Annex XIV describes and notes the applicable mesh sizes, gauges, 
gauging procedure, and usage in the Regulatory Area. For accuracy, pictorial representations of 
gauges and sizes are also included. 
246
 Id., Annex 1.A lists the TACs and quotas for the calendar year for stocks such as cod, 
redfish, etc. 
247
 Id., Article 14. 
248
 Id., Article 13. 
249
 Id. See also with respect to some of these measures n. 245 above and accompanying text. 
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vessel authorised by the Contracting Party is present in the Regulatory Area.250  
Contracting parties engaged in surveillance or inspection activities in the 
Regulatory Area must aim at ensuring equal treatment between all Contracting 
Parties having vessels operating in the Regulatory Area through an equitable 
distribution of inspections. A ratio between the number of inspections and 
fishing activity of the inspected Contracting Party, based on, inter alia, catch 
levels, fishing days, and compliance records of that particular state, will, as far 
as possible, have to be followed in this respect.251 Moreover, inspection vessels 
operating in the Regulatory Area have to maintain contact, as far as possible on 
a daily basis, and with due regard to radio security, in order to exchange 
information on boardings/sightings or other relevant information and to 
coordinate their activities.252 Furthermore, Contracting Parties engaged in 
inspection or surveillance activities in the Regulatory Area have the duty to 
prepare reports of inspection activity, based on a calendar year, outlining details 
of boardings, sightings, and apparent infringements.253 
Each Contracting Party has to ensure that each of its vessels operating in 
the Regulatory Area is equipped with a satellite-tracking device allowing the 
continuous tracking of its position by the Contracting Party.254 Automatic 
communication should occur at least every two hours to a land-based 
monitoring centre of the flag state.255 To this end the satellite tracking device 
must allow for automatic communication at least once every six hours when 
operating in the Regulatory Area to a land-based fisheries monitoring centre of 
data relating to the following: 
 
1. The vessel identification 
2. The most recent geographical position of the vessel (longitude, latitude) 
with a position error which has to be less than 500 metres, with 
a confidence interval of 99 percent 
3. The date and time of the fixing of the said position of the vessel 
                                                 
250
 NAFO C&E Measures, n. 48 above, Article 36 lists a gear requirement infringement as 
a serious infringement, therefore making security and continuity of evidence an imperative, 
hence the need to minimise the possible delay in reporting these infringements. 
251
 Id., Article 28(6). 
252
 Id., Article 28(3). 
253
 NAFO Convention, n. 191 above, Article 18, in general, and NAFO C&E Measures, n. 48 
above, Article 29(1), in particular. This stipulation comes with an annual time limit by the first 
of November. By this time, Contracting Parties are to notify the Executive Secretary of 
provisional participatory plans. According to Article 29(3) of the NAFO C&E Measures, this 
will ensure coordination of operations between Contracting Parties. 
254
 NAFO C&E Measures, n. 48 above, Article 25(1). 
255
 Id., Article 25(1). This Article 25(1) stipulation operates to maintain compliance with 
vessels in adherence to the conservation and enforcement measures in the Regulatory Area. 
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The flag state has to keep these records for three years.256  
Each Contracting Party has to take the necessary measures to ensure that 
its land-based fisheries monitoring centre receives these data.257 The land-based 
monitoring centre of the flag state subsequently has to transmit this information 
to the Executive Secretary, but not later than 24 hours after having received 
these communications.258 Upon the request of the Contracting Party, this 
information can also be sent directly from the vessel to the Executive Secretary. 
Moreover, the land-based fisheries monitoring centre of each Contracting Party 
ought to be equipped with computer hardware and software enabling automatic 
data processing and electronic data transmission. Each Contracting Party is 
obliged to provide for back-up and recovery procedures in case of system 
failures.259 
NAFO has set up a system of blacklisting of flag of convenience illegal, 
unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing vessels.260 It works with a provisional 
list that enumerates vessels that have been identified as having been engaged in 
fishing activities contrary to the convention regime. Enquiries are subsequently 
made into the reasons why these vessels were fishing without permission, and if 
there is no suitable explanation, the vessel is transferred permanently to the 
IUU list.261  
NAFO previously had a system of port inspection in place whereby a 
vessel which had been engaged in fishing for stocks subject to the conservation 
and enforcement measures could offload in a port of a Contracting Party. 
However, this system has created numerous difficulties within the surveillance 
and inspection scheme. NAFO is currently working on a revised port control 
system. This is discussed below under “Common/Similar Initiatives by NAFO 
and NEAFC.” 
 
 
                                                 
256
 Id., Article 25(2). 
257
 Id., Article 25(1 & 2). 
258
 Id., Article 25(6). As previously noted, in n. 250 above, this is to ensure speedy reporting 
and coherence between Contracting Parties. 
259
 NAFO C&E Measures, n. 48 above, Article 25(2). 
260
 Id., Articles 47 & 50. Contracting Parties participate in this procedure by submitting to the 
Secretariat information relevant for the identification and listing of Non-Contracting Parties 
carrying out IUU fishing in the Regulatory Area. Thereafter, the Standing Committee on 
International Control (STACTIC) will recommend the applicable sanction to be meted out to 
the Non-Contracting Party. 
261
 For more information on IUU lists, see NAFO website at <http://www.nafo.int/about/ 
frames/about.html> (retrieved 20 November 2008). See also “Common/Similar Initiatives by 
NAFO and NEAFC” section in this chapter below. 
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Strengths of the NAFO System 
 
Membership. Even though any state can become member of the NAFO 
founding document, membership of the Fisheries Commission itself is 
restricted to Contracting Parties either participating in fisheries in the 
Regulatory Area, or parties with evidence that they expect to participate in such 
fisheries during the year of the annual meeting or during the following calendar 
year.262 In the latter instance, however, the evidence must be judged satisfactory 
by the General Council, where Contracting Parties are represented and have one 
vote.263 The ability of the General Council264 to review and determine the 
membership of the Fisheries Commission at each annual meeting indicates that 
this body exercises some degree of control in membership management. As in 
the NEAFC system, if new members seek to obtain membership in the Fisheries 
Commission, “such new members should be aware that presently and for the 
foreseeable future, stocks managed by NAFO are fully allocated, and fishing 
opportunities for new members are likely to be limited.”265 Under the NEAFC 
system this has been reviewed as “appropriate,”266 but doubts abound as it has 
been argued to be the reason for continued unregulated fisheries in the 
convention area.267 
Open System in Theory. Participation in the Convention is open to any 
state subject to notification in writing to the depository. However, the 
membership of the Fisheries Commission is limited to parties that either 
participate in the fishing activities in the Regulatory Area, or provide evidence 
that they are going to participate in such fisheries in the near future.268 
Currently it is quite difficult to be admitted as a member of the Fisheries 
                                                 
262
 NAFO Convention, n. 191 above, Article 13(1). 
263
 Id., Article 14(1). 
264
 Note that each Contracting Party in accordance with Article 4(1) of the NAFO Convention is 
a member of the General Council. 
265
 NEAFC Performance Report, n. 43 above, Appendix XI, p. 91. In 2003, the NEAFC 
Commission adopted these guidelines for states seeking membership as Contracting Parties of 
NEAFC or as Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties. The limiting nature of these stipulations is 
an indication of the fact that, at present, all resources in the NEAFC Regulatory Area are 
overexploited. See also n. 208 above, and accompanying text. 
266
 NEAFC Performance Report, Section 3.5.2.1, p. 49. 
267
 M. W. Lodge, D. Anderson, T. Løbach, G. Munro, K. Sainsbury, and A. Willock, 
Recommended Best Practices for Regional Fisheries Management Organizations: Report of 
an Independent Panel to Develop a Model for Improved Governance by Regional Fisheries 
Management Organizations (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2007), 
available: <http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/10301_rfmo0807.pdf> (retrieved 20 Nov-
ember 2008), pp. 17 and 36. 
268
 See n. 262 above, and accompanying text. 
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Commission due to limited resources in a limited area.269 The fact that the 
membership of the Fisheries Commission is reviewed annually by the General 
Council means that there is still a possibility of interested states obtaining 
membership as NAFO does not, in theory, operate a closed membership 
system. 
Full Observer Vessels Coverage. Even though this certainly is 
an achievement of NAFO, the substantial costs involved to make such a system 
operational should not be underestimated: It costs an estimated USD26 million 
per year for Canada and USD362 million per year for the EC.270 
Satellite Fishing Vessels Tracking and Real-time Reporting. As noted in 
the aforementioned point, the costly nature of full observer vessel coverage has 
lead to a system where states are allowed 25 percent coverage by observers 
supplemented by more detailed and frequent electronic reporting.271 
Port State Inspection. NAFO has developed its port state inspection 
system, in line with NEAFC developments, making it one of the more 
progressive systems that can serve as example for others. 
Non-Contracting Party Vessels. NAFO has established a scheme to 
promote compliance by Non-Contracting Party vessels with the conservation 
and enforcement measures. Contracting Parties have to report to the NAFO 
Secretariat all sightings made by inspectors of Non-Contracting Party fishing 
vessels engaged in fishing activities in the NAFO Regulatory Area.272 Such 
reports must include all information derived from the inspector’s observations 
concerning the Non-Contracting Party fishing vessel’s activities. The inspector 
will attempt to inform the Non-Contracting Party fishing vessel that it has been 
sighted engaging in fishing activities, that a surveillance report has been 
completed,273 that there may be consequences for the vessel, and that this 
                                                 
269
 NAFO Thirtieth Annual Meeting, n. 125 above, p. 29, Annex 5. Fisheries Commission’s 
Request for Scientific Advice on Management in 2010 and Beyond of Certain Stocks in 
Subareas 2, 3 and 4 and Other Matters (FC WP 08/41, Rev. 2 now FC Doc 08/19), para. 6. Here 
it was noted that many of the stocks in the NAFO Regulatory Area are in need of rebuilding. 
This means that the stocks are below the stock biomass or recovery milestone of 60,000 tonnes 
(Blim). 
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 High Seas Task Force, Closing the Net: Stopping Illegal Fishing on the High Seas 
(Governments of Australia, Canada, Chile, Namibia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, 
WWF, IUCN, and the Earth Institute at Columbia University, 9 March 2006), available: 
<http://www.high-seas.org/docs/HSTFfinal/HSTF-Final-Report-09-03-06.pdf> (retrieved 
12 November 2008), p. 25. 
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 Lodge et al., n. 267 above, p. 49. 
272
 NAFO C&E Measures, n. 48 above, Article 47(1). Article 47(1) stipulates the unequivocal 
and immediate presumption of infringement on the part of a Non-Contracting Party vessels 
engaging in fishing activities in the Regulatory Area. See also n. 217 above. 
273
 NAFO C&E Measures, n. 48 above, Article 47(3). 
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information will be distributed to all NAFO Contracting Parties and to the flag 
state of the vessel. 
In the event that a Non-Contracting Party vessel that has been sighted and 
reported as engaged in fishing activities in the NAFO Regulatory Area is 
boarded by inspectors, the findings of the inspectors must be transmitted to the 
Executive Secretary.274 The Executive Secretary will transmit this information 
to all Contracting Parties within one business day of receiving this information 
and to the flag state of the boarded vessel as soon as possible.275 
In addition, Contracting Parties agree to bring to the attention of any state 
not a party to the NAFO Convention any matter relating to fishing activities in 
the Regulatory Area undertaken by nationals or vessels of that state276 that 
appear to affect adversely the attainment of the objectives of the Convention.277 
The Contracting Parties further agree to confer when appropriate upon the steps 
to be taken towards obviating such adverse effects. However, it should be noted 
that the absence of a formal framework for cooperation brings into question the 
effectiveness of such a system for Non-Contracting Parties.278 
Traditional Rights. Proposals adopted by the Fisheries Commission for 
the allocation of catches in the Regulatory Area take into account the interests 
of members whose vessels have traditionally fished within that area. In the 
allocation of catches from the Grand Bank and Flemish Cap,279 Fisheries 
Commission members must give special consideration to the Contracting Party 
whose coastal communities are primarily dependent on fishing for stocks 
related to these fishing banks and which have undertaken extensive efforts to 
ensure the conservation of such stocks through international action,280 in 
particular by providing surveillance and inspection of international fisheries on 
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 Id., Article 48(1). 
275
 Id. 
276
 Note that these acts are presumed to be illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing 
activities under Article 47 of the NAFO C&E Measures. 
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 NAFO C&E Measures, n. 48 above, Article 54(1) is NAFO’s attempt to include Non-
Contracting states’ relations with Contracting Party states in its control and enforcement 
measures. Here the theme is that of Non-Contracting states’ cooperation with Contracting 
Parties. 
278
 D. Owen, Recommended Best Practices for Regional Fisheries Management Organizations: 
Practice of RFMOs Regarding Non-members, Technical Study No. 2 (London: The Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 2007), available: <http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/ 
files/9997_rfmotech2.pdf> (retrieved 20 November 2008), p. 8. 
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 NAFO Convention, n. 191 above, Article 11 (4). 
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 Id. In relation to the Flemish Cap, the Fisheries Commission restricts shrimp fishing in 
Division 3M, whereupon lies the Flemish Cap, based on the advice of the Scientific Council in 
the interest of conservation and stock control. NAFO C&E Measures, n. 48 above, Article 14. 
For a discussion of the scientific assessments in relation to the Flemish Cap, see NAFO 
Thirtieth Annual Meeting, n. 125 above, p. 4. 
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these banks under an international joint enforcement scheme.281 
Review of Performance. NAFO has recently undergone a review of its 
performance. Contrary to the NEAFC recent practice, this was an internal 
review. It nevertheless also constitutes a recommended best practice.282 
 
 
Weaknesses of the NAFO System 
 
Objection Procedure in the Convention. If any Fisheries Commission member 
presents to the Executive Secretary an objection to a proposal, within sixty days 
of the date of transmittal, the proposal will not become a binding measure on 
that member. This procedure, albeit not often relied upon, still is used between 
two and four times each year.283 
Absence of Dispute Settlement Procedure. The present NAFO Convention 
does not include a dispute settlement procedure, however, an amendment to the 
NAFO Convention adopted in 2007, but not yet in force, contains an elaborated 
dispute settlement provision.284 
Absence of Enforcement Powers. Compared to its member states, NAFO 
has no autonomous powers in case of infringements of reporting and gear 
requirements. Before any action can be taken, the consent of the flag state is 
required.285 
Absence of Conventional Provision on Cooperating Non-Contracting 
Parties. Even though the NAFO conservation and enforcement measures 
contain some provisions for cooperation, other than the stipulation that states 
should adhere to their obligations,286 the present amendment to the Convention 
on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries is 
without a provision on cooperation between Non-Contracting Parties. Although 
the amendments are not yet in force, this was a missed opportunity. Article 16 
only addresses the issue of Non-Contracting Parties in general and specifically 
approaches the issue without examining the issue of cooperation with Non-
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 NAFO C&E Measures, n. 48 above, Chapter IV. 
282
 Lodge et al., n. 267 above, p. 115. A performance review is likely to be addressed by NAFO 
after the amended convention has entered into force and is implemented. 
283
 Id., p. 39. 
284
 Amendment, n. 41 above, Article 3, introducing amongst others a new provision concerning 
settlements of disputes, namely Article 15. 
285
 NAFO C&E Measures, n. 48 above, Article 38 states that the competent authorities, upon 
notification of an infringement, are duty bound to investigate this infringement. This means that 
all enforcement powers lie within the flag state’s domain. It must be admitted that this state of 
affairs is rather the rule than the exception in RFMOs. 
286
 Id., Article 54 notes the need for cooperation in order to ensure the effectiveness of the 
control and enforcement measures adopted pursuant to the Convention. 
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Contracting Parties.  
There are, however, some conventional provisions which impact on this 
issue in an indirect manner.287 Examples of the indirect applicability of the 
Convention’s provisions are evident when one notes that Non-Contracting 
Parties can consent to boarding288; the vessel can establish that it applied all 
relevant conservation and enforcement measures in order to land or transship 
fish289; the flag state can report back after the placing of the vessel on the 
provisional list on the measures it has taken290; the flag state can, after the IUU 
listing of a vessel, report back to the Standing Committee on International 
Control that it has taken effective action to stop the vessel from further IUU 
fishing activities, either through sanctions or adjustment of the fishing 
licence291; the flag state can exchange information with NAFO regarding 
vessels on the IUU list in order to help detect control and prevent false 
import/export certificates292; and the flag state can, after being so requested, 
agree to fully cooperate with NAFO and implement its conservation and 
enforcement measures.293 Nonetheless no advantages for the non-contracting 
state formally ensue from any of these actions. 
 
 
Implementation of the 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement 
 
As called for under the 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement, NAFO requires 
high seas fishing vessels to report their fishing areas, catches, and landings. 
Their reports are inspected under a 100 percent observer scheme.294 When 
a fishing vessel has been sighted committing an infringement, the flag state has 
to be informed. The flag state has to react as if the infringement had been 
committed in waters under its jurisdiction.295 
NAFO generally complies with the provisions of the 1993 FAO 
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 For a more detailed analysis, see Owen, n. 278 above, pp. 100–103. 
288
 NAFO C&E Measures, n. 48 above, Article 48(1). 
289
 Id., Article 50(2). 
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 Id., Article 49(2). 
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 Id., Article 53(k). 
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 Id., Article 54(1). 
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 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement, n. 97 above. Article 4 calls for state parties to have 
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the parties of the convention in order to harmonise international conservation and management 
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 Id., Article 3(8) notes that in addition to sanctions under national jurisdiction, sanctions can 
also include a refusal, suspension, or withdrawal of the authorisation to fish on the high seas.  
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Compliance Agreement. For example, NAFO’s objective is to promote the 
conservation and optimum utilisation of fishery resources in the Northwest 
Atlantic.296 All vessels operating in the NAFO area have to register with the 
Executive Secretary.297 
 
 
Implementation of the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement 
 
The Fisheries Commission seeks to ensure consistency between any proposal 
that applies to a stock or group of stocks occurring both within the Regulatory 
Area298 and within an area under the fisheries jurisdiction of a coastal state, or 
any proposal that would have an effect through species inter-relationships on 
a stock or group of stocks occurring in whole or in part within an area under the 
fisheries jurisdiction of a coastal state.299 The Fisheries Commission also seeks 
consistency between any measures or decisions taken by the coastal state for 
the management and conservation of that stock or group of stocks with respect 
to fishing activities conducted within the area under its fisheries jurisdiction.300 
The appropriate coastal state and the Fisheries Commission accordingly 
promote the coordination of such proposals, measures and decisions.301 
The NAFO Contracting Parties agree to maintain and implement within 
the Regulatory Area a scheme of joint international enforcement.302 This 
scheme includes provisions for reciprocal rights of boarding and inspection by 
the Contracting Parties and for flag state prosecution and sanctions on the basis 
of evidence resulting from such boardings and inspections. A report of such 
prosecutions and sanctions imposed is included in an annual statement 
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 NAFO Convention, n. 191 above, Preamble and Article 2(1). 
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 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement, n. 97 above. Article 4 stipulates that all parties maintain 
a record of all its fishing vessels. NAFO C&E Measures, n. 48 above, Article 19(1) obliges all 
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 NAFO Convention, n. 191 above, Article 11(3.a). See also R. Rayfuse, “Canada and 
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and is the requirement that the management regime applied to the high seas portion corresponds 
with the management regime of the coastal state within its EEZ. Rayfuse also notes that this 
practice, as originated by NAFO, has been applied other by RFMOs as well as by international 
agreements. 
300
 NAFO Convention, n. 191 above, Article 11(3.b). 
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 Id., Article 11(4) in general and Article 18 in particular. 
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regarding the actions that were taken during the last year.303 
The Contracting Parties agree to bring to the attention of any state not 
a party to this Convention any matter relating to fishing activities in the 
Regulatory Area undertaken by nationals or vessels of that state that appear to 
affect adversely the attainment of the objectives of the Convention.304 
The Contracting Parties further agree to confer when appropriate upon the steps 
to be taken towards obviating such adverse effects.305 Furthermore, in 1997, 
NAFO adopted a scheme to promote compliance by Non-Contracting Party 
vessels with its conservation and enforcement measures.306 In the event that any 
Non-Contracting Party vessel that has been sighted and reported as engaged in 
fishing activities in the NAFO Regulatory Area consents to be boarded by 
NAFO inspectors, the findings of NAFO inspectors are transmitted to the 
NAFO Secretariat.307 The NAFO Secretariat will transmit this information to all 
NAFO Contracting Parties within one business day of receiving this 
information and to the flag state of the boarded vessel as soon as possible.308 As 
well as providing the Non-Contracting Party’s vessels with a copy of the 
findings of the NAFO inspectors, the flag state of the boarded vessel is also 
forwarded a copy of the NAFO inspectors report.309 
As regards the call for port state enforcement provisions under the UN 
Fish Stocks Agreement, NAFO has had a system of port state enforcement in 
place, but it is presently under reconsideration. This is discussed below under 
“Common/Similar Initiatives by NAFO and NEAFC.” 
 
 
10.4.5.2. The North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission 
 
Structure, Membership and Organization 
 
The NEAFC covers the North East Atlantic, including dependent seas, and the 
200 nm zones, with the exception of Baltic Sea and the Belts, as well as the 
Mediterranean Sea and its dependent seas. These areas mostly correspond with 
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 Id., Article 19. 
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 NAFO C&E Measures, n. 48 above, Chapter VI notes the rules of presumed infringement in 
relation to Non-Contracting Party vessels in the Regulatory Area. 
307
 Id., Article 47(3). 
308
 Id., Article 47(4). 
309
 Id. 
  322 
FAO Statistical Area 27.310 
NEAFC has a relatively simple structure. There is the NEAFC 
Commission itself, which is composed of all members, and a Secretariat. There 
is no internal scientific body. However, in 2003, NEAFC concluded 
a memorandum of understanding with ICES311 by virtue of which scientific 
advice is received, against payment that represents about 20 percent of the 
annual budget of NEAFC. The NEAFC Commission is also empowered to set 
up subsidiary bodies, if this is considered “desirable” for the exercise of its 
duties and functions.312 
The current membership is made up of the following: Denmark (in 
respect of the Faeroe Islands and Greenland), the EU, Iceland, Norway, and the 
Russian Federation.313 In 1982, when the NEAFC Convention entered into 
force, there were 13 members, but most of them are currently EU Member 
States. These Member States include Bulgaria (EU membership 2007; 
discontinued membership in the NEAFC Commission in 1995), Estonia (EU 
membership 2004; joined the NEAFC Commission in 2003 and discontinued its 
membership in 2006), Finland (EU membership 1995), Poland (EU 
membership 2004; discontinued membership in the NEAFC Commission in 
2006), Portugal (EU membership 1986) and Sweden (EU membership 1995). In 
1990, the German Democratic Republic unified with Germany. Since 
Greenland withdrew from the EC in 1985 it has been represented by 
Denmark.314 
The organisation has specific provisions for what it calls Cooperating 
Non-Contracting Parties.315 A Non-Contracting Party seeking that status must 
submit a request containing the following information: data on historical 
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fisheries, current fishing activities, and details on research programmes it has 
conducted in the Regulatory Area and the results which it is willing to share 
with NEAFC.316 It must also accept to respect the NEAFC Scheme317 and other 
recommendations, communicate to NEAFC the measures it takes to ensure 
compliance, and annually communicate catch and effort data.318 On the 
recommendation of the Permanent Committee on Control and Enforcement 
(PECCOE), the NEAFC Commission decides on the granting of such status on 
an annual basis. If granted, the states involved can participate in the plenary and 
scientific meetings of the NEAFC as an observer. At present Belize, Canada, 
Cook Islands, Japan, and New Zealand fall within this category.319 
The objective of NEAFC is to perform its functions in the interests of the 
conservation and optimum utilisation of the fishery resources of the convention 
area.320 Consequently, NEAFC is empowered to recommend a wide variety of 
conservation and management measures.321 The responsibility for enforcing 
management measures adopted under the NEAFC rests with the Contracting 
Parties. They are required to take such action, including the imposition of 
adequate sanctions for infractions, as may be necessary to implement any 
recommendations adopted by the NEAFC Commission.322 However, in 1999, 
a Scheme of Joint International Inspection and Surveillance was adopted, 
closely following the models provided by the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement 
and NAFO. 
 
 
Reporting and Verification 
 
Each Contracting Party ensures that all fishing vessels flying its flag and 
conducting fishing activities in the Regulatory Area keep a bound fishing 
logbook and, where appropriate, a production logbook and storage plan.323 
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The Contracting Party makes sure that its fishing vessels communicate catch 
reports to their land-based fisheries monitoring centre or directly to the 
Secretary if the Contracting Party so wishes. 
A Contracting Party is required to report the quantities on board when 
entering the Regulatory Area. This report shall be made no more than twelve 
hours and at least two hours in advance of each entry into the Regulatory 
Area.324 Moreover, a report on weekly catches must be transmitted at the latest 
at the end of the seventh day after the entry into the Regulatory Area. When 
fishing trips take more than seven days, the master of the fishing vessel is 
obliged to transmit by the latest on Monday at noon the catches taken in the 
Regulatory Area during the preceding week ending Sunday midnight. This 
report must include information on the number of fishing days since the 
commencement of fishing, or since the last catch report.325 
Further, the Contracting Party is requested to report the quantities on 
board when exiting the Regulatory Area. This report has to be made no more 
than eight hours and at least two hours in advance of each exit from the 
Regulatory Area. It must include, where appropriate, the number of fishing 
days and the catch taken in the Regulatory Area since the commencement of 
fishing, or since the last catch report.326 Finally, the Contracting Parties have to 
report the quantities on-loaded and off-loaded for each transhipment of fish 
during the vessel’s stay in the Regulatory Area.327 
Each Contracting Party has the duty, within thirty days following the 
calendar month in which the catches were landed, or transhipped, to report to 
the Secretary provisional monthly statistics of catches of fisheries, whether or 
not that party has quota allocations for the stocks from which catches were 
obtained.328 The Secretary, within ten days following the monthly deadlines for 
receipt of the provisional catch statistics, collates the information received and 
circulates it to the Contracting Parties.329 These reporting obligations also apply 
to regulated resources caught in areas under national fisheries jurisdiction.330 
Additional requirements relate to inspection activities reports. Each 
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Contracting Party is obliged to report to the Secretary by 1 October of each year 
for the period 1 July to 30 June the number of inspections conducted by it under 
the NEAFC. The report should specify the number of inspections on the vessels 
of each Contracting Party and, in the case of infringement, the date and position 
of the inspection of the named vessel and the nature of infringement.331 The 
Contracting Party also has the duty to report the number of air hours flown and 
the number of days at sea on NEAFC patrol, the number of sightings, and the 
number of surveillance reports established, as well as the follow-up of such 
reports. 
 
 
Inspection and Boarding Schemes 
 
Each Contracting Party assigns inspectors to the NEAFC Scheme. Each 
inspector carries special documentation of identity as a NEAFC inspector 
issued by the respective Contracting Party and is obliged to hold and produce 
this document of identity when boarding a fishing vessel.332 
Each Contracting Party notifies the Secretary before 1 January of each 
year of the names of the inspectors and special inspection vessels, as well as the 
type of aircraft and the details of their identification, which they are assigning 
to the NEAFC Scheme for that year.333 Modifications by Contracting Parties to 
such notifications must be communicated to the Secretary giving one month’s 
notice.334 The Secretary in turn circulates such notifications within fifteen days 
of receipt to all Contracting Parties.335 
Any vessel assigned to the NEAFC Scheme and carrying assigned 
inspectors, as well as the boarding craft deployed by that vessel, carries a 
special flag or pennant to indicate that inspectors on board may carry out 
inspection duties in accordance with the NEAFC Scheme. Aircraft assigned to 
the NEAFC Scheme must have their international radio call sign clearly 
displayed.336 
Furthermore, each Contracting Party has the duty to keep a record for 
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their assigned inspection vessels and aircraft of the date and hour of the start 
and termination of their duties under the NEAFC Scheme and to provide this 
information to the NEAFC Secretary. The Secretary promptly informs the other 
Contracting Parties.337 
Special rules apply when more than ten fishing vessels of any one 
Contracting Party are engaged in fishing activities on regulated resources in the 
Regulatory Area at the same time. The Contracting Party is required, during 
that time, to have an inspection vessel in the Regulatory Area, or to cooperate 
with another Contracting Party to jointly operate an inspection vessel.338 
The NEAFC Scheme sets out a series of general inspection and 
surveillance principles to guide the inspection process. Each Contracting Party 
ensures that assigned inspectors from another Contracting Party are allowed to 
carry out inspections on board those of its fishing vessels to which the NEAFC 
Scheme applies. Furthermore, it has the duty to adopt measures obliging the 
masters of the fishing vessels to cooperate with the assigned NEAFC inspectors 
and to ensure their safety throughout the inspection.339 
Moreover, each Contracting Party ensures that inspections carried out by 
that party are carried out in a non-discriminatory manner and in accordance 
with the NEAFC Scheme. The number of inspections is based upon fleet size, 
taking into account the time spent in the Regulatory Area. In its inspections, 
each Contracting Party aims at ensuring equal treatment between all 
Contracting Parties with fishing vessels operating in the Regulatory Area 
through an equitable distribution of inspections.340 
Inspectors have to avoid the use of force except when and to the degree 
necessary to ensure their safety. When carrying out inspections on board fishing 
vessels, inspectors cannot carry any firearms.341 In addition, without limiting 
the capability of inspectors to carry out their mandates, inspections have to be 
made so that the fishing vessel, its activities, and the catch retained on board do 
not suffer undue interference and inconvenience.342 
The NEAFC Scheme also establishes the parameters of the inspection 
procedure. No boarding can be conducted without prior notice by radio being 
sent to the fishing vessel or without the fishing vessel being given the 
appropriate signal using the International Code of Signals, including the 
identity of the inspection platform, whether or not such notice is acknowledged 
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as received.343 There can be no more than two inspectors in an inspection party 
from one Contracting Party boarding a fishing vessel of another Contracting 
Party.344 Additionally, each Contracting Party has to ensure that its inspection 
platforms manoeuvre at a safe distance from the fishing vessels according to 
good seamanship.345 
An inspector has the authority to examine all relevant areas, decks and 
rooms of the fishing vessels, catch (whether processed or not), nets or other 
gear, equipment, and any relevant documents that the inspector deems 
necessary to verify the compliance with the measures established by NEAFC 
and to question the master or a person designated by the master.346 The fishing 
vessel to be boarded cannot be required to stop or manoeuvre when fishing, 
shooting, or hauling. The inspectors may order the interruption or delay in the 
hauling of the fishing gear until they have boarded the fishing vessel and in any 
event no more than thirty minutes after receiving the signal.347 In addition, 
inspectors ought not to interfere with the master’s ability to communicate with 
the authorities of the flag state during the boarding and inspection.348  
The duration of an inspection may not exceed four hours, or until the net 
is hauled in and the net and catch are inspected, whichever is longer. In the case 
of an infringement being detected, the inspectors may stay on board for the time 
necessary for the completion of the inspection. However, in special 
circumstances relating to the size of a fishing vessel and the quantities of fish 
retained on board, the duration of the inspection may exceed the limits 
stipulated above. In such a situation, the inspecting party shall in no case stay 
longer on board the fishing vessel than the time required to complete the 
inspection. The reasons for exceeding the limit stipulated above have to be 
recorded in the inspection report.349 
In carrying out their inspection, the inspectors may request of the master 
any assistance required.350 Moreover, the report of the inspection may be 
commented upon by the master and must be signed by the inspectors at the end 
of the inspection. A copy of the inspection report has to be given to the master 
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of the fishing vessel.351  
During an inspection, the master of a fishing vessel is requested to 
facilitate prompt and safe boarding. The master is to cooperate with and assist 
in the inspection of the fishing vessel conducted pursuant to these 
procedures,352 and not obstruct, intimidate or interfere with the inspectors in the 
performance of their duties. Moreover, the master has to allow inspectors to 
communicate with the authorities of the flag Contracting Party and the 
inspecting Contracting Party. Further, the master must provide them access to 
relevant areas, decks and rooms of the fishing vessel, catch (whether processed 
or not), nets or other gear, equipment, and any relevant documents.353 
The NEAFC Scheme also establishes procedures for reporting 
infringements, with special procedures provided for serious infringements. If 
the inspectors find that there are clear grounds for believing that a fishing vessel 
flying the flag of another Contracting Party has engaged in any activity contrary 
to NEAFC recommendations, they are required to note the infringement in the 
inspection report and to take all necessary measures to ensure security and 
continuity of the evidence for subsequent dockside inspection.354 An 
identification mark may be affixed securely to any part of the fishing gear that 
appears to the inspector to have been in contravention of applicable 
measures.355 
In order to facilitate Contracting Party action on the infringement, 
inspectors immediately are obliged to attempt to communicate with an 
inspector or designated authority of the Contracting Party of the inspected 
fishing vessel.356 In addition, the Contracting Party inspecting a fishing vessel 
ought to communicate in writing the details of an infringement to the 
designated authorities of the Contracting Party of the inspected vessel within 
the working day following the inspection whenever possible.357 The original of 
the inspection report, together with any supporting documentation, is to be 
forwarded promptly to the appropriate authorities of the Contracting Party of 
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the inspected fishing vessel as well as a copy to the Secretary.358 
A serious infringement means: 
 
1. Fishing without a valid authorisation issued by the flag Contracting 
Party 
2. Fishing without or after attainment of a quota 
3. Use of prohibited fishing gear 
4. Serious mis-recording of catches 
5. Repeated failure to comply with the communication procedure 
6. Landing or transshipment without authorisation of the port state 
7. Preventing an inspector from carrying out his duties 
8. Directed fishing for a stock that is subject to a moratorium or for which 
fishing is prohibited 
9. Falsifying or concealing the markings, identity or registration of 
a fishing vessel 
10. Concealing, tampering with or disposing of evidence relating to 
an investigation 
11. Multiple violations that together constitute a serious disregard of 
conservation and management measures 
12. Engaging in transshipment or joint fishing operations with vessels of 
a Non-Contracting Party which has not been accorded the status of 
a Cooperating Non-Contracting Party 
13. Supplying any provisions, fuel or other services to vessels that have 
been placed on the IUU list359 
 
If a NEAFC inspector considers that there are clear grounds for believing 
that a fishing vessel has committed a serious infringement, the inspector must 
promptly notify the flag Contracting Party of that infringement as well as the 
Secretary.360 The flag Contracting Party is obliged to respond to the notification 
without delay and to ensure that the fishing vessel concerned is inspected 
within 72 hours by an inspector duly authorised by that flag Contracting 
Party.361 In order to preserve the evidence, the inspector is required to take all 
necessary measures to ensure security and continuity of the evidence whilst 
minimising interference with and inconvenience to the operation of the 
vessel.362 Moreover, the inspector is entitled to remain on board the fishing 
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vessel for the period necessary to provide information to the duly authorised 
inspector concerning the infringement or until the response of the flag 
Contracting Party requires the inspector to leave the fishing vessel.363  
The flag Contracting Party, if evidence so warrants, requires the fishing 
vessel to proceed immediately to a port designated by that Contracting Party for 
a thorough inspection under its authority and in the presence of a NEAFC 
inspector from any other Contracting Party that wishes to participate.364 
Additionally, the flag Contracting Party may authorise the inspecting 
Contracting Party to bring the fishing vessel without delay to a port designated 
by the flag Contracting Party.365 If the fishing vessel is not called to port, the 
Contracting Party must provide due justification in a timely manner to the 
Secretary and to the inspecting Contracting Party. The Secretary has to make 
such justification available on request to any Contracting Party.366 Where 
a fishing vessel is required to proceed to port for a thorough inspection in 
accordance with control measures,367 a NEAFC inspector from another 
Contracting Party may, subject to the consent of the Contracting Party of the 
fishing vessel, board the fishing vessel as it is proceeding to port, may remain 
on board the fishing vessel as it proceeds to port, and may be present during the 
inspection of the fishing vessel in port.368 
The appropriate authorities of a Contracting Party notified of 
an infringement committed by a fishing vessel of that party are requested to 
take prompt action to receive and consider the evidence of the infringement 
and, conduct any further investigation necessary for the follow up to the 
infringement and, whenever possible, inspect the fishing vessel concerned.369 
Each Contracting Party has to designate the appropriate authorities mandated 
for receiving evidence of infringement and has to inform the Secretary of the 
address of those authorities.370 The Secretary then shall subsequently inform all 
other NEAFC Contracting Parties.371  
The NEAFC Scheme makes provisions for mutual recognition of 
inspectors. In the interest of uniformity, each Contracting Party is required to 
consider and act on reports from inspectors of other Contracting Parties under 
                                                 
363
 Id., Article 30(4). 
364
 Id., Article 30(5). 
365
 Id., Article 30(6). 
366
 Id., Article 30(7). 
367
 Id., Articles 5 & 6. 
368
 Id., Article 30(8). 
369
 Id., Article 28(4). 
370
 Id. 
371
 Id. 
  331 
the NEAFC Scheme on the same basis as reports from its own inspectors.372 
Contracting Parties must also cooperate in order to facilitate judicial or other 
proceedings arising from a report submitted by an inspector under the NEAFC 
Scheme.373 
 
Other Enforcement Provisions/Schemes 
 
The NEAFC Scheme includes specific provisions to facilitate enforcement 
concerning fishing vessels, including provisions for IUU fishing vessels and 
port state measures. Each Contracting Party notifies, in computer readable 
form, to the Secretary prior to 1 January of each year if possible, or in any case 
before the vessel’s entry into the Regulatory Area, all fishing vessels authorised 
to fish in the Regulatory Area and notably whether the vessel is authorised to 
fish one or more of the regulated resources. Each Contracting Party is requested 
to notify any modifications to this information without delay.374 
Each Contracting Party is required to implement a vessel monitoring 
system (VMS) for its fishing vessels exceeding 20 metres between 
perpendiculars or 24 metres overall length which fish, or plan to fish, in the 
Regulatory Area. The Contracting Party must require its fishing vessels, fishing 
in the Regulatory Area, to be equipped with an autonomous system capable of 
automatically transmitting messages to a land-based fisheries monitoring centre 
(FMC), thereby allowing a continuous tracking of the position of a fishing 
vessel by the Contracting Party of that fishing vessel.375 This system became 
operational on 1 January 2000.376 
To this end, each party ensures that the satellite device enables a fishing 
vessel to communicate to the Contracting Party the following data: 
 
1. The vessel identification 
2. The most recent geographical position of the vessel with a position error 
of less than 500 metres and with a confidence interval of 99 percent 
3. The date and time of the fixing of the said position of the vessel 
4. Where applicable, data relating to the catch on board 
5. Where applicable, data relating to transhipment377 
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Moreover, each Contracting Party guarantees that the master of a fishing vessel 
flying its flag ensures that the satellite-tracking devices are at all times fully 
operational and that all the information is transmitted. In the event of 
a technical failure or non-operation of the satellite-tracking device fitted on 
board a fishing vessel, the device must be repaired or replaced within one 
month. After this period, the master of a fishing vessel is not authorised to 
commence a fishing trip with a defective satellite-tracking device. In case 
a device stops functioning and a fishing trip lasts more than one month, the 
repair or the replacement has to take place as soon as the vessel enters a port. 
The fishing vessel is not authorised to continue or commence a fishing trip 
without the satellite-tracking device having been repaired or replaced.378 Each 
Contracting Party also has to make sure that a fishing vessel with a defective 
satellite-tracking device communicates, at least daily, their reports by other 
means of communication (radio, fax, or telex).379 
Contracting Parties, for the purpose of this scheme, cooperate with the 
Secretary in order to establish a database delimiting the Regulatory Area by 
latitude and longitude coordinates.380 This occurs without prejudice to each 
Contracting Party’s position concerning the delimitation of sea areas under their 
sovereignty and jurisdiction.381 
NEAFC has set up a system for blacklisting flag of convenience IUU 
fishing vessels.382 When vessels are observed in the area fishing without a valid 
licence, they are added to the ‘A’ list, i.e., a provisional list of IUU vessels.383 
Enquiries are subsequently made into the reasons why these vessels were 
fishing without permission, and if there is no suitable explanation, the vessel is 
transferred permanently to NEAFC’s ‘B’ list.384 Vessels can only be removed 
from this list by decision of the NEAFC Commission at its annual meeting. The 
listing system seems to be reaping its first rewards, with recent instances where 
                                                 
378
 Id., Article 11(3). 
379
 Id., Article 11(4). In addition, Annex VIII, Section 5, notes the stipulated format for 
transmission of information. 
380
 Id., Article 11(5). 
381
 Id. 
382
 This is known as the ‘A’ and ‘B’ listing system. According to the panel in the NEAFC 
Performance Report (n. 43 above), this is a significant change in combating IUU fishing in the 
Regulatory Area. 
383
 NEAFC Scheme, n. 214 above, Article 44(1). 
384
 Id., Article 44(3). This list is available at NEAFC, “Management Measures Currently in 
Force,” available: <http://www.neafc.org/measures/iuu-b.htm> (retrieved 20 November 2008). 
This listing system was established in 2005 and has taken a stance in combating activities of 
IUU vessels. However, the degree of state control and the degree of cooperation between 
Contracting Parties and the Secretariat in this matter is yet to be clarified, as will be noted later 
on in this study. 
  333 
listed vessels have been scrapped. This issue is discussed below under 
“Common/Similar Initiatives by NAFO and NEAFC.” 
NEAFC has also adopted port state control measures. It has a special 
system in place to control the landings or transshipments of foreign vessels in 
ports of Contracting Parties. First, the Contracting Parties have to designate 
ports were such landings will be allowed.385 The master of a foreign vessel 
intending to call into such a port must notify the competent port authorities at 
least three working days in advance.386 The port state subsequently forwards 
this information to the flag state of the vessel.387 When the flag state confirms 
by return copy388 that the vessel in question had sufficient quota for the species 
declared, that the quantities of fish on board have been duly reported and 
considered in the calculation of any catch or effort limitations that may be 
applicable, that the vessel in question had authorisation to fish in the areas 
declared, and finally, that this information was verified according to VMS, the 
fish can be landed or transshipped.389  
 
 
Strengths of the NEAFC System 
 
Membership. The Convention lists individual parties eligible to participate in 
the Convention and the NEAFC Commission. Importantly, this list includes the 
EU. Any state not referred to in this list (Member States of the EU excepted) 
may accede to the Convention subject to the approval of three-fourths of all the 
Contracting Parties.390 In 2003, the NEAFC Commission adopted the 
Guidelines for the Expectation of States Considering Applying for Membership 
of NEAFC and Possible Fishing Opportunities in the NEAFC Regulatory 
Area.391 According to these Guidelines, new entrants “should be aware fishing 
opportunities for new Contracting Parties will not be allocated on stocks 
already regulated.” Further, new entrants will only be entitled to allocations 
from unregulated stocks on the same basis as other Contracting Parties.392 
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Three such applications have been made, of which two were rejected (Ukraine 
and Lithuania), and only one (Estonia), was accepted. The Performance Review 
Panel considered this process to be “appropriate.”393 However, others have 
stated that this is instead an incentive to engage in unregulated fishing.394 
Scope. The NEAFC Commission may also adopt recommendations 
concerning fisheries conducted within the national jurisdiction of a Contracting 
Party, but only if the Contracting Party in question specifically requests and 
approves the recommendation.395 
Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties. The Performance Review Panel 
was of the opinion that the criteria to become a Cooperating Non-Contracting 
Party are transparent, appropriate, and applied accordingly. In contrast to other 
RFMOs, NEAFC expressly foresees the possibility of granting cooperation 
quotas to Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties.396 Such quotas have been 
accorded in practice. According to the Recommendation for Conservation and 
Management Measures for Pelagic Redfish in the Irminger Sea and Adjacent 
Waters in the NEAFC Convention Area in 2008, 123 tonnes of redfish will be 
available to Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties, as was the case in 2007.397 
Moreover, NEAFC has created opportunities for Cooperating Non-Contracting 
Parties to participate in the supply chain as the general prohibition to engage in 
transhipment or joint shipping operations, normally considered to be a serious 
infringement with vessels of Non-Contracting Parties, does not apply here. 
These vessels, when sighted in the Convention area, are not automatically 
presumed to be undermining NEAFC. The rules applicable to vessels of other 
non-Contracting Parties are distinguished by the rules applicable to Cooperating 
Non-Contracting Parties, hence the ‘A’ and ‘B’ list system.398 
Non-Contracting Party Vessels. NEAFC has been an example for other 
RFMOs for the development of a scheme for Non-Contracting Party fishing 
vessels. A Non-Contracting Party vessel, which has been sighted engaging in 
fishing activities in the Regulatory Area, is presumed to be undermining the 
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effectiveness of recommendations established under the Convention.399 In the 
case of any transhipment activities involving a sighted Non-Contracting Party 
vessel inside or outside the Regulatory Area, the presumption of undermining 
the effectiveness of recommendations established under the Convention applies 
to any other Non-Contracting Party vessel that has engaged in such activities 
with that vessel.400 Information regarding such sightings must be transmitted 
immediately to the Secretary.401 The Secretary has to transmit this information 
to all Contracting Parties within one business day of receiving this information 
and to the flag state of the sighted vessel as soon as possible.402 The Contracting 
Party which sighted the Non-Contracting Party vessel has to attempt to inform 
such a vessel that it has been sighted engaging in fishing activities in the 
Regulatory Area and is accordingly presumed to be undermining the 
recommendations established under the Convention and that this information 
will be distributed to all Contracting Parties and to the flag state of the vessel.403  
In the event that any Non-Contracting Party vessel, which has been 
sighted and reported as engaged in fishing activities in the Regulatory Area, 
consents to be boarded by NEAFC inspectors, their findings are to be 
transmitted to the Secretary.404 The Secretary has the duty to transmit this 
information to all Contracting Parties within one business day of receiving this 
information and to the flag state of the boarded vessel as soon as possible.405 
The Non-Contracting Party vessel that is boarded must be provided with a copy 
of the findings of the NEAFC inspectors.406 
Port Inspections. Contracting Parties shall ensure that their vessels do not 
receive transhipments of fish from a Non-Contracting Party vessel that has been 
sighted fishing in the NEAFC area.407 When such a vessel enters a port of any 
Contracting Party, it shall be inspected by authorised Contracting Party officials 
knowledgeable about the recommendations established under the 
Convention.408 The vessel is not to be allowed to land or tranship any fish until 
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this inspection has taken place.409 Such inspections include the vessel’s 
documents, log books,410 fishing gear,411 catch on board,412 and any other 
matter relating to the vessel’s activities in the Regulatory Area. 
Landings and transhipments of all fish from a Non-Contracting Party 
vessel which has been inspected shall be prohibited in all Contracting Party 
ports if such inspection reveals that the vessel has on board species subject to 
recommendations established under the Convention. This is the procedure until 
it is established that the fish were caught outside the Regulatory Area or in 
compliance with all relevant recommendations established under the 
Convention.413 
Information on the results of all inspections of Non-Contracting Party 
vessels conducted in the ports of Contracting Parties, and subsequent action, 
have to be immediately transmitted through the Secretary to all Contracting 
Parties and as soon as possible to the relevant flag state(s).414 
Each Contracting Party annually reports to the Secretary by mid-
September for the period 1 July to 30 June the number of inspections of 
Non-Contracting Party vessels it conducted under this Scheme in its ports, the 
names of the vessels inspected and their respective flag state, the dates and 
ports where the inspection was conducted, and the results of such 
inspections.415 
As a part of the existing comprehensive NEAFC Control and 
Enforcement Scheme, new measures have been adopted. A new measure, which 
entered into force on 1 May 2007, effectively closes Contracting Party ports to 
landings of frozen fish which have not been certified by the flag state of the 
vessel intending to land.416 Additionally, the coastal state can also limit the 
number of ports where frozen fish is allowed to be landed in order to streamline 
these inspections.417 
Vessels without Nationality. Where there are reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that a vessel, which has been sighted engaging in fishing activities in 
the Regulatory Area, is without nationality, a NEAFC Contracting Party may 
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also board and inspect the vessel.418 Where evidence warrants, a NEAFC 
Contracting Party may take such action as may be appropriate in accordance 
with international law.419 Contracting Parties are encouraged to examine the 
appropriateness of domestic measures to exercise jurisdiction over such 
vessels.420 
Review of performance. NEAFC has recently undergone a review of its 
performance.421 In 2006, a panel consisting of internal NEAFC representatives 
and external experts submitted its final report, which was discussed by the 
organisation at a special meeting in 2007. This clearly constitutes 
a recommended best practice in the management of the Regulatory Area.422 
 
 
Weaknesses of the NEAFC System 
 
Objection Procedure. Any Contracting Party may object to a recommendation 
within 50 days of the date of notification of that recommendation.423 In the 
event of such an objection, any other Contracting Party may similarly object 
within 40 days after receiving notification of that objection.424 If any objection 
is made within this further period of 40 days, other Contracting Parties are 
allowed a final period of 40 days after receiving notification of that objection in 
which to lodge objections.425 A recommendation does not become binding on 
a Contracting Party that has objected thereto.426 If three or more Contracting 
Parties have objected to a recommendation, it will not become binding on any 
Contracting Party.427 Except when a recommendation is not binding on any 
Contracting Party, a Contracting Party which has objected to a recommendation 
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may at any time withdraw that objection. It then becomes bound by the 
recommendation within 70 days, or as from the date determined by the NEAFC 
Commission, whichever is the later.428 If a recommendation is not binding on 
any Contracting Party, two or more Contracting Parties may nevertheless at any 
time agree among themselves to give effect thereto. In this event, they must 
immediately notify the NEAFC Commission accordingly.429 The use of such 
an objection procedure could well undermine the conservation of the 
resource.430 
Formal Absence of Dispute Settlement Procedure. In 2004, 
an amendment was proposed concerning a dispute settlement procedure 
whereby states would be obliged to explain their reasons for using the objection 
procedure. Even though these amendments were adopted in 2005, they have not 
yet entered into force.431 
Lack of Convention Basis for Non-Contracting Parties Rights and 
Obligations. The “new” 2007 Convention does not intend to enumerate the 
rights and obligations of non-Contracting Parties. At present, these rights are 
scattered throughout the NEAFC Scheme,432 the Non-Contracting Parties 
Scheme,433 and the 2003 Guidelines for the Expectation of Future New 
Contracting Parties with Regard to Fishing Opportunities in the NEAFC 
Regulatory Area.434 All of these measures are without a Convention basis. 
Vessel Monitoring System. Even though the database of the vessel 
monitoring system is quite innovative and forms an essential element in the 
NEAFC monitoring scheme, the Performance Review Panel is of the opinion 
that the quality of the information deserves enhanced control and that the use of 
this state of the art technology by NEAFC is underutilised.435 
Inspections. The Performance Review Panel noted that one Contracting 
Party was obviously not participating in the system since it had so far not 
deployed inspectors or inspection vessels in the Regulatory Area, even though 
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it is so required under the Convention system.436 
 
 
Implementation of the 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement 
 
The preamble of the “new” 2007 Convention explicitly “recognises” the 
1993 FAO Compliance Agreement.437 NEAFC inspectors remain under the 
operational control of the authorities of their Contracting Parties. However, 
they have the powers of inspection, seizure and search, as defined in the 
NEAFC Scheme of Joint International Inspection, as well as surveillance 
implementation under the 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement.438 
In determining the extent to which Contracting Parties recognise the 
Compliance Agreement, the current NEAFC Scheme enjoins Contracting 
Parties to ensure that stated measures to be taken, whether administrative action 
or criminal proceedings, are in conformity with the Contracting Party’s national 
law against the natural or legal persons responsible where there has been a 
derogation from NEAFC measures.439 The measures taken are to be in 
accordance with the relevant provisions of national law, be capable of 
effectively depriving the beneficiaries of any economic benefit, or provide 
sanctions proportionate to the seriousness of such infringements, thus 
discouraging future infringements.440 
High seas fishing vessels have to report their catches in the NEAFC area. 
Each entry and exit has to be reported. These reports are inspected by the 
observers and by port inspectors.441 NEAFC also includes high seas 
conservation and management measures with a stated objective of NEAFC 
performing its functions in the interests of the conservation and optimum 
utilisation of the fishery resources of the convention area.442 All vessels 
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operating in the NEAFC area have to register with the Secretary.443 
The NEAFC Scheme consists of new technologies in fisheries monitoring, and 
establishes control measures, rules on reporting IUU activities, as well as port 
state control measures. These features are designed to ensure adequate high sea 
fisheries management as called for under the 1993 FAO Compliance 
Agreement. 
When a vessel has been sighted committing an infringement, the flag state 
is informed. The appropriate authorities of the Contracting Party are notified of 
the infringement committed by the fishing vessel and have to take prompt 
action to receive and consider the evidence of the infringement.444 The 
Performance Review Panel concluded that the NEAFC “Contracting Parties 
largely fulfil their duties as Flag States.”445 
 
 
Implementation of the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement 
 
As with the 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement, the preamble of the “new” 
NEAFC Convention explicitly “recognises” the 1995 UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement.446 
The Contracting Parties agree to maintain in force and to implement 
within the Regulatory Area the NEAFC Scheme. The latter includes provisions 
for reciprocal rights of boarding and inspection by the Contracting Parties447 
and for flag state prosecution and sanctions on the basis of evidence resulting 
from such boarding and inspection.448 A report of such prosecutions and 
sanctions imposed shall be included in an annual statement regarding the 
actions that were taken during the preceding year.449 
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As regards Non-Contracting Parties, the Contracting Parties agree to 
bring to the attention of any Non-Contracting Party any matter relating to the 
fishing activities in the Regulatory Area of the nationals or vessels of that state 
that appear to affect adversely the attainment of the objectives of the 
Convention.450 The Contracting Parties further agree to confer, when necessary, 
in order to assess steps to be taken towards obviating such adverse effects. 
NEAFC adopted a scheme to promote compliance by Non-Contracting Party 
vessels with the conservation and enforcement measures established by 
the NEAFC.451 Further, when a non-Contracting Party vessel, which has been 
sighted and reported as engaged in fishing, enters a port of any NEAFC 
Contracting Party, it shall be inspected by authorised Contracting Party 
officials.452 
NEAFC aims to make its information and decision making processes 
accessible for Contracting Parties and observers. Observers were only allowed 
to attend meetings in 2001. However, the Performance Review Panel noted that 
discussions on allocations are often not open to all Contracting Parties and 
observers. It stressed the need for improvement in ensuring transparency 
between participating coastal states in quota allocation and management 
measures.453 In addition, the current lack of access to information by NGOs 
should be reversed, especially prior to NEAFC Commission meetings.  
 
 
10.4.5.3. Common/Similar Initiatives by NAFO and NEAFC 
 
A recent noteworthy positive development is that both NAFO and NEAFC have 
tried, albeit not concurrently, to pay very close attention to the achievements of 
the other. Several examples are provided viz. 
Since 2002 both organisations have been cooperating with respect to the 
management of pelagic redfish in the Irminger Sea, a straddling fish stock 
between the two convention areas. NEAFC receives the scientific advice and 
establishes the management measures, including the allocation of the total 
allowable catch in the NAFO area. For control purposes, however, catches are 
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reported to both the NAFO Fisheries and NEAFC Commissions.454 
Additionally, NAFO and NEAFC have recently joined forces to establish 
an overarching North Atlantic list of IUU vessels. Vessels on the list of IUU 
vessels of the NEAFC are automatically transferred to the NAFO list and vice 
versa. The underlying rationale is that because both Regulatory Areas are 
adjacent, there are straddling stocks in their respective Regulatory Areas and as 
IUU fishing is a global phenomenon, the vessels listed under one convention 
system are presumed to be engaged in IUU fishing activities in the Regulatory 
Area of the other.455 NEAFC Recommendation XI of 2008 expands this kind of 
cooperation to CCAMLR and South-East Atlantic Fisheries Organisation 
(SEAFO). Further, the Recommendation adds that delisting is only possible if 
the organisation originally listing the vessel decides to do so.456 Thus, as noted 
by the NEAFC Performance Report, NEAFC could well serve as a useful 
reference to other RFMOs in this respect as it demonstrates a positive 
development in fisheries management.457 
A third, more recent example of common initiatives, is NAFO’s newly 
adopted port state control scheme, which was inspired by NEAFC practice in 
the Regulatory Area. NAFO’s former port state control provisions required 
vessels that had been fishing for stocks subject to conservation and enforcement 
measures to call in the port of a Contracting Party to be inspected when 
offloading their catch. Even though the interference of the inspectors in the 
offloading activity was minimal, the quality of the catch had to remain 
unaffected, but this was compromised by the fact that such inspections took 
time. The ensuing reports were then forwarded to the port state, upon request, 
and to the Executive Secretary. A 2007 discussion paper proposed 
an amendment and, after many adaptations, was finally adopted at the thirtieth 
annual meeting of the NAFO Fisheries Commission in late September 2008. 
The new system very much resembles the successful port state control system 
adopted by NEAFC a year earlier. It is based on the following measures: the 
master has to present prior notification to the port state, which is forwarded to 
the flag state. No authorisation to land or tranship the cargo in port will be 
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granted without the flag state of the Non-Contracting Party vessel confirming 
the legal status of the catch.458 All the documents involved are posted on the 
secure part of the NAFO website.459 The scheme even moves beyond the port 
state measures which are presently being developed in FAO on some points. 
The objective of the drafters of these new NAFO provisions on port state 
control was clearly to reflect as closely as possible the port state control 
mechanism of NEAFC.  
 
 
10.5. Conclusion 
 
While Canada and the EU are well known for sparring over fisheries interests 
and allocations in the NAFO Regulatory Area, Canada and the EU have 
displayed considerable cooperation since the famous Estai incident. Both have 
played substantial roles in achieving modernization amendments to reflect the 
ecosystem and precautionary approaches in regional fisheries management 
agreements. Both have cooperated in enhancing regional compliance and 
enforcement arrangements in NAFO. 
Canada and the EU continue to face four major challenges in regional 
fisheries management. Putting the precautionary approach into practice has 
been problematic with quotas for some stocks set above precautionary scientific 
advice or without precautionary reference points. Implementing the ecosystem 
approach might be described as “just leaving port” with still very limited 
scientific understandings of marine ecosystems and limited protections given to 
vulnerable marine ecosystems. Reaching consensus on allocation criteria for 
shared fish stocks continues to be a thorny issue in both NAFO and NEAFC. 
Achieving effective compliance and enforcement remains a challenge with 
various constraining realities including exclusive flag state jurisdiction to 
prosecute regulatory offences beyond national maritime zones and the slow 
entry into force of dispute settlement procedures.  
Clearly Canada and the EU have not reached an end point in 
strengthening cooperation within regional fisheries management. Various 
questions remain to be traversed: 
 
• Should scientific advice be subject to political override? 
• How might the role of scientific advice be strengthened within RFMOs? 
• How might the ecosystem approach be bolstered at the regional level? 
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• What initiatives, if any, should be considered for further crystallising 
fisheries allocation criteria? 
• Should the closer cooperation between NAFO and NEAFC be extended 
to other RFMOs? 
• How much reliance on state of the art information technology is 
desirable? 
• Should the fundamental changes in the compliance and enforcement 
strategies of RFMOs be reflected in their conventions?  
• How might cooperation with non co-operating non-Contracting Parties 
be enhanced? 
 
 
